Valparaiso University

ValpoScholar
The Cresset (archived issues)
9-1982

The Cresset (Vol. XLV, No. 8)
Valparaiso University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/cresset_archive
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The Cresset (archived issues) by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please
contact a ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

• Norman Mailer and the Ironies of Art and Life
• Can the Insanity Defense Be Defended?

tJ~?iJi:Ji;j'rj, ,c,,~gree

• Why Edwin Meese Deserved His

.
J •

l

-.lt

) , ,t ,•

l
C., .J

>
.,

l)
')

')

"}) ,>)
')
,)

f)

J)))

•

?

~

'•

AUG 1 9 1982

THE CRESSEY

Valparaiso University

ROBERT V. CH ABEL, Publisher
JAMES NUECHTERLEI , Editor

Valparaiso, Indiana 46383

SEPTEMBER, 1982 Vol.

LV,

0011 -1198

o. 8

Contributors
3 The Editor I I L CE T A
6 Sister Maura I RUMORS OF GOD
7 Bruce Berner I THE•J~ •
EFE SE: G ILTY BY REA O

••i ,' ,

:

12
13
17
18
20
24
25

•

•• •

•

•

•

'

f

OF HI

KLE ?

• •

Rudolf Witten{Jer,gJ: GRO
DZ '?\.•.',
N
'S SECRET
Conrad Hyer :[HE NOBLEST GAM}: , •
Sister Maur~ ~;PS{\LM FROM THE HEM~LOBIN WARD

i

···· ··~:,
.....
Christa Resf~yet ~ iJ~(~~UNp .4..!'{Q'fHE MESSIA

THE IG

OF M RK

((

IC HOPE
D THE EXECUTIO ER'S SONG
< t (
e
Richard M#u,ell I f•p~R Ptin: Qi THi.m EM TIC ROMA CE
John Steve~: Rlu/ I IN A FAMiL~ \{, AY•:••••:
Harold J mrris I
I

C

«OR~{\N~ cflltri:' JACK ABBOTT, A

I

C.

C CI.I'

C:

t

C

CC' •

1

J..,iihIE FIELD
,•P,f-¢ iND BOARD

28 Sister Maura {:r«t-IE HUNCHBACK
29 Jill Baumgaert;;,•J•POETRY I

0

31 Ken Ba.zyn I THE IOWA STATE FAIR
32 John Strietelmeier I REFLECTIONS OF AN OLD LIBERAL-I

Departmental Editors
Jill Baumgaertner, Poetry Editor
Richard H. W. Brauer, Art Editor
Dorothy Czamanske, Copy Editor
Walter E. Keller, Book Review Editor

Business Managers
Wilbur H. Hutchins, Finance
Betty Wagner, Administration and Circulation

THE CRESS ET is published monthly during the academic
year, September through May, by the Valparaiso University Press as a forum for scholarly writing and informed
opinion. The views expressed are those of the writers
and do not necessarily reflect the preponderance of
opinion at Valparaiso University. Manuscripts should
be addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return
postage. Letters to the Editor for publication are subject
to editing for brevity. The Book Review Index and the
American Humanities Index list Cresset reviews. Second
class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana. Regular subscription rates: one year- $6.50; two years-$11.50;
single copy-$.85. Student subscription rates: one year$3.00; single copy-$.50. Entire contents copyrighted
1982 by the Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso,
Indiana 46383, without whose written permission reproduction in whole or in part for any purpose whatsoever is expressly forbidden.

2

Cover Comments
Elizabeth Nourse (American 1860-1938), Le Gouter, 1893, oil on
canvas, 45" x 29½ ': Valparaiso University Art Collection, Percy
Sloan Bequest. Photo: Robert Wallace, Indianapolis Museum of
Art.
A native of Cincinnati, Elizabeth Nourse lived out her
career in France and became best known for her paintings
of Brittany peasant mothers and their children. In Le Gouter,
she explores the effects of lantern light on these subjects as
they are having an evening snack.
Le Gouter was in the collection of the Chicago Art Institute
from 1897-1950. It came to Valparaiso University from the
estate of Percy Sloan in 1953 but was listed as artist and title
unknown. Prompted by visiting art historians, research un, dertaken in 1981 revealed its true identity.
In the Spring of 1982 it received conservation treatment at
the Indianapolis Museum of Art Conservation Lab. Its conservation was funded by the Indiana Arts Commission, the
ational Endowment for the Arts, and Valparaiso University's Sloan Fund.
In November, 1982, Le Gouter will be lent to the ational
Museum of American Art for a major Elizabeth Nourse retrospective exhibit, accompanied by a catalog raisonne of her
work. The catalog essay will include references to Le Gouter
a well a a reproduction of a photograph of it. In the Spring,
the exhibit will go to the Cincinnati Art Museum.
RHWB
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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
The University and Mr. Meese
At its Commencement exercises last spring, Valparaiso Univer ity awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws
degree to Pre idential Counselor Edwin Meese III. As
might have been expected, the University's action
stirred up considerable controversy. Groups of students,
faculty, and alumni indicated varying degrees of displeasure when the announcement was first made, and
for a time it appeared that the award ceremony would
be marked by some form of active protest demonstration.
In the end, voices of moderation prevailed, and the
only signs of discontent at the ceremony were a scattering of protest badges and some white sheets of paper
worn atop the mortarboards of a small percentage of
the graduating students. The audience of students,
faculty, and friends and relatives of the graduates received Mr. Meese politely, even warmly (a number of
students gave him a standing ovation as a form of counter-protest), and the ceremonies passed without disruptive incident. Those unhappy with the conferral of
the degree had made their point, but had done so without creating a major disturbance that might have marred
the day for those others- and they were obvious! y in the
majority-who either approved the degree or remained
indifferent to the whole matter.
Most of those associated with the University-including, it seems clear, the great majority of those opposed
to the granting of the degree-were pleased that civility
and decorum had been maintained, not only at the
ceremonies themselves but also during the prior campus
debate concerning the issue that dragged on through
the early spring. As things stand, it is highly unlikely
that the dispute will leave any significant residue of
bitterness or bad feeling.
It is therefore with some uneasiness that we re-open
the issue here. The event is past, and there is much to
be said for letting it rest undisturbed. Yet the Meese
affair raised important questions related to University
practice, political principle, and public morality that
never seemed to get fully aired, much less resolved .
Aside from exchanges that occurred in a number of
private conversations, the debate was never adequately
joined. We think it deserved to be, and it is for that
reason that we offer the following observations.
September, 1982

It is best to begin with the case for the opposition. The
fullest expression of that case came in the statement
issued in mid-April by 92 members of the University's
faculty and staff. We reprint the text in full:
We, the undersigned, protest our University's plan to
bestow an honorary degree on Edwin Meese III at Commencement, May 23, 1982.
This choice disappoints us because we believe Mr.
Meese 's record does not fulfill three of the four major criteria set forth by our University for such degrees: service to
humanity, contn'butions and philosophy consistent with
VU's Chn'stian objectives, and sympathy to VU's role in
the academic world.
Mr. Meese 's activities have been largely negative. Under
Reagan in California he mapped out state welfare cuts, led
the campaign to dismantle legal services for the poor, and
was involved in gathen·ng information to be used against
activists in civil rights, anti-war, and anti-nuclear concerns.
Is this service to humanity? We think not.
Meese has emerged as a leading advisor for the Reagan
administration-a regime whose policies (1) work to the
disadvantage of the poor; (2) enrich the military establishment (a point about which Eisenhower warned); (3) drain
resources from educational, cultural, social, and environmental concerns; (4) have reversed the gain made in race
relations; and (5) have increased international tensions,
especially with regard to the Soviet Union, Central A merica, the Middle East, and China. Is this service to humanity?
We think not.
Furthermore, Meese was the principal advocate of exempting from legal action certain colleges where guaranteed student loans are the only form of Federal aid received ( ew York Times, March 17, 1982). hould we
confer an honorary degree on a man who seeks legal loopholes which enable colleges to escape their moral obligations to women and minon'ties? Is this service to humanity?
We think not.
Mr. Meese has attacked the American Civil Liberties
Union as part of a nationwide "cn"minal s lobby. " He has
also supported preventive detention and decried the exclusion of illegally gathered evidence from trials ( urr nt
Biography, 1981, p. 288). ls ,as seroice to humanity? We
think not.
Meese has supported cutting legal aid to the indigent
saying, " We don 't want mane
oin for promotion of
social causes" ( hi a o ribun March 21, 1 '.2). Yet he

The lo ic of the argument of opponents of the Meese degree led in dir ctions that, followed to the
end, !ould have ominous consequences for the preservation of civil discourse in political deb te.

promotes a social cause when he supports taxing the wealth
lightly. Is th£s philosophy consistent with VUs objectives?
We think not.
What, then, recommends M r. Meese for an honorary
degree from VU? We know that Mr. Meese is a Lutheran
in a powerful position. But in a politicized world, in which
Lutherans fully participate, a Lutheran university should
be judiciously selective in its choice of candidates in the
political sphere for honorary degrees. We support our University 's criteria for the honorary degree, but we find little
evidence that Mr. Meese meets these criteria.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the Faculty Statement, it is first necessary to clear ltp a matter that frequently, and erroneously, got introduced into the debate. The Meese affair did not involve the question of
free speech or academic freedom. Some of those unhappy with the protest suggested that the protestors
were violating the principle that a university should be
an arena of full and untrammeled debate, where all
points of view can be expressed without regard to their
popularity or propriety. Critics of Meese, it was argued,
were attempting to take away from him the platform
that their own liberal principles would insist he should
have. But that was not the case. The critics made a careful distinction: their protest, they insisted, was not
against the University's invitation to Mr. Meese to
speak; it was rather against its decision to award him an
honorary degree. Thus a number of protestors sported
badges that read, "Meese, yes-degree, no." (As it
turned out, Mr. Meese delivered an address so bland it
could not conceivably have offended anyone.)
Yet if on this question the protestors made the necessary distinctions, on other matters they were not so
scrupulous. Indeed, the logic of their argument in the
Faculty Statement led in directions that, followed to
their end, would have ominous consequences for the
preservation of civil discourse in American political
debate. If the protestors meant what they said, they
were excluding from moral legitimacy the political
views held by a very substantial segment of the American public.
Consider the argument of the Faculty Statement. Mr.
Meese it says, does not deserve to receive an honorary
degree from Valparaiso University. Why? Because he
does not fulfill the criteria set forth for recipients of
such degree , specifically tho e relating to service to
humanity and to contributions and philosophy consistent with the University's Chri tian objectives. (The
reference to "sympathy to VU's role in the academic
world" never get developed in the bill of particulars,
and so however Mr. Mee e is imagined to have fallen
short in that category, hi failure there would not eem
to constitute a significant element in the indictment.)
The rest of the document attempts to pecify the actions
4

of Mr. M

that h " him t ha

fa il d t

j cti
to humanit
d gr r ipi
havioral h aract ri ti
ian , j urnali t
politician
t . who arli r r c iv d
recognition from the ni r it
r not xp ct d to
pass mu ter for candidac to ainthood ; th y w re imply expected to ha
rv d honorably in their profe ions and to ha e e tabli hed a r ecogniz d r cord of
service to community church, and world.
In analyzing the li t of grievances brought against
Mr. Meese, the reader immediately find him elf in the
midst of a political thicket. It becomes clear that the
primary evidence adduced to reveal Mr. Mee e's antihumanist and anti-Chri tian activities has to do less with
behavioral impropriety (the references there are sketchy
and undeveloped) than with improper or inappropriate
political belief and as ociation. The most substantive
section of the Faculty Statement, paragraph four ,
amounts simply to a political broadside against the
policies of the Reagan Administration, and much of the
rest of the Statement particularizes from that general
indictment.
The reference further on to Mr. Meese's attack on the
American Civil Liberties Union and to his general hardline position on the rights of criminals implies that
such attitudes toward the law lie beyond the boundaries
of jurisprudential respectability. Yet those attitudes,
however controversial, are held by a large number of
honorable and informed legal authorities and can hardly be seen as ipso facto evidence of anti-humanist inclinations. Many people, after all, agree with Mr. Meese that
the legal system currently gives disproportionate attention to the rights of the accused at the expense of the
security and safety of the general community. They may
be right or wrong in that belief, but that is not here the
issue.
The relevant point is not whether or not one agrees
with Edwin Meese's political/legal beliefs, or whether
they are in themselves either profoundly wise or abysmally foolish. It is rather whether one can hold those
beliefs and support the policies appropriate to them
and still consider oneself a friend to humanity and a
practicing Christian. The Faculty Statement suggests
not. It seems to say in effect-we do not see how else it
can be read-that to be a political conservative, at least
in the manner of Mr. Meese, is to be by definition antihumanist and anti-Christian. Thus a political test is set
for moral legitimacy (as that legitimacy is defined by the
University in the criteria established for recipients of
honorary degrees), and Reagan conservatives fail that
The Cresset

The assumption that political conservatives automatically come in conflict with VU's Christian
objectives should come as extraordinary news to many elements in the University's constituency.
test automatically. Th objections to Mr. Meese would
seem to hold for any other candidate of a similar political persuasion.
The as umption that political conservatives automatically come in conflict with V 's Christian objectives
should come a extraordinary news to many elements
in the University's constituency. We would guess that a
majority of Valpo' alumni and students-though perhaps not of its faculty-identify themselves, in one way
or another, as conservatives, and that they harbor sympathetic feelings toward the Reagan Administration.
One can imagine their chagrin when informed of the
moral inadequacy indicated by their political preferences.
The issue extends well beyond the confines of the
University community. Political civility is always a
fragile commodity, and it cannot long be sustained in a
context in which political participants question not just
the opposition's wisdom or good sense but its moral
credentials. Liberals who rightly become exercised at
the Christian political Right's tendency to denounce its
opponents as enemies of God's will would do well to
draw carefully the lines by which they define the
morally tolerable in politics.
Those lines do exist, of course. A Christian can adhere to any of a great range of political philosophies
and still remain Christian, but he cannot believe just
anything. We cannot see, for example, how a person
can claim the faith while at the same time espousing a
philosophy of fascism or racism or Stalinist communism.
Yet those extreme cases would hardly seem to fall in the
same category occupied by standard-brand American
conservatives or liberals. It has always been America's
good fortune that its major political parties and groups
shared, beneath their differences, a broad common set
of beliefs and assumptions. Our politics is today more
polarized than it used to be, but for the sake of the nation's political health, we ought to consider carefully
before we exclude our opponents from the ranks of the
morally legitimate. For when things come to that, we
are already engaged in a form of civil war.
We know some signers of the Faculty Statement who
would concede that much of the opposition to Mr.
Meese was essentially political in nature-indeed that
it was directed more at Ronald Reagan than at Edwin
Meese-and who are uneasy with the implications of the
argument put forward in the Statement. But, they argue,
their political action was only taken in response to the
prior political action of those who proposed the degree
in the first place. Why, they ask, should Edwin Meese
have been selected out of an almost infinite list of potential degree candidates if not for the reason that he is
a prominent conservative? Was not the University
thereby making a political gesture intended to ingraSeptember, 1982

tiate itself both with those in power and with the more
conservative elements in its own constituency? Such a
political gesture, the argument goes, deserved and got a
political gesture in reply.
A similar view of the political nature of the affair
came from a quite different source. An editorial in the
June 21 issue of the ultra-conservative Christian News
condemned the critics of Mr. Meese and commended
the University for awarding a degree to "a Biblebelieving layman like Meese, who also champions the
free enterprise system and recognizes the dangers of
socialism and communism." Warming to its subject, the
editorial went on to suggest draconic action (or so it
seemed) against the protestors: "The radical left wing
professors at Valparaiso should not be teaching at a
Lutheran University." (All of which reveals that the
writer of the editorial understands as little about the
make-up of the University faculty as about the nature
of academic freedom: a purge of "radical left wing professors" at Valparaiso would fail for lack of suitable
victims.)
We would not pretend to be able to discern the intentions of those who proposed the degree for Mr.
Meese or who voted in favor of it at the various stages
of committee consideration along the road to full faculty
approval. But the circumstantial evidence provided by
the University's past record indicates that it was not involved, in a collective sense at least, in a conservative
political gesture. Valparaiso University has awarded a
number of honorary degrees to political figures in recent years, some of them to conservatives like Mr.
Meese, but several others to people who most decidedly
were not. Among those receiving degrees have been
prominent liberal Democrats such as former Senator
Vance Hartke of Indiana, Congressman Paul Simon of
Illinois, and Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary. If the
University was making political gestures with awards
to these men, it was in an entirely different direction
than that suggested in the Meese affair.
But in fact one no more has to conjure up "political"
motives for the degress awarded to Messrs. Hartke,
Simon, and Hatcher than for the one bestowed on Mr.
Meese. In each of these cases, it was particularly appropriate that Valparaiso University should honor the di tinction that the candidate had achieved in public affairs. Mr. Hatcher is an alumnu of the niversity's law
school. Mr. Hartke and Mr. imon, like Mr. Mee e, are
active laymen in the Lutheran Church. In all four instances, then, the niversity wa granting recognition
to those who were, in one way or another, p culiarly
its own.
It makes no more en e to a ume that in honoring
Mr. Meese the niver ity wa ignaling approval for hi
conservative political leaning than to uppo that the
5

If a university is to award honorary degrees at all, there is no reason for it to exclude men
and women who have attained distinction in the honorable calling of politics and public affairs.

awards granted to the other three revealed it hidd n
liberal predilections. One can honor a political figur
for what he has achieved without thereby nee aril
indicating agreement with his political philo oph . The
citation accompanying Mr. Mee e' degree hailed him
as "faithful churchman, respected lawyer dedicated
public servant." It noted that he is "probably the mo t
eminent Lutheran in public life since Peter Muhlenberg, the first Speaker of the House of Representative '
-a touch of hyperbole, perhaps, but at least arguable.
Nowhere did it refer to his political beliefs. Tho e who
would argue that this was a political award, or that the
candidate did not measure up to those in a similar category honored before him, would seem to have a heavy
burden of argument to carry.
A case could be made that in order to avoid even the
suspicion of partisan preference or of improper deference to power the University should refrain from awarding honorary degrees to any individuals active in political life. Such a policy would serve to protect the University's political neutrality and so has much to recommend it. But if a university is to award honorary degrees at all, we wonder if, out of concern only for the
purity of its own reputation, it should exclude men and
women who have attained distinction in the honorable
calling of politics and public affairs. It should be noted
here that the Faculty Statement advocated no such policy. It argued only that the University should be "judiciously selective" in its choice of candidates from the
public sphere, an argument that, in the context of the
entire document, seemed to have distinctly partisan
implications.
It is hazardous for a university to honor men and women in political life but it is not inappropriate, especially, perhaps, in the kind of situation presently before
us. Critics of Lutheran piety have traditionally noted
its inclination to ignore the public sphere and to define
the duty and calling of Christians in ways that avoided
contact with the political realm. Many contemporary
Lutherans-including, we would guess, many of those
who igned the Faculty Statement-think that the tradition of Lutheran quietism hould be set aside. They do
not see public life a standing outside or beneath the
proper arena of Christian ethical concern, and they
would encourage Christian to participate more actively
in the affairs as ociated with the left hand of God.
We ympathize entirely with uch views, and so think
that the degree award d to Mr. Mee e was highly appropriate, not b cau e he i a conservative, but becau e he
i an active Lutheran Christian layman who makes no
ecret of hi religious commitment and who ha achieved
high di tinction in public life. We cannot imagine that
we would have felt otherwi e about the awarding of the
degree if Mr. Mee e had happen d to be as liberal a he
6
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The ge ture involved in awarding an honorary degre to Edwin M e e wa not 'p litical' in the narrow
sen e. But the action did convey a m ag , one with
which friend of the niver ity, whatever th ir political
inclination , ought to feel entirely comfortable.
Cl

Rumors of God
The storm came at dusk:
out of sick-grey sky
wind funneled a ram
of battering boughs
rising and falling
against gravity. Rains
meshed leaves.
Light never was.
Earth broke. Roots rose
from dark working,
primeval threatening.
But from the high hollow
of a stricken oak,
after the bee hive
hurtled down and,
alien, somersaulted up,
it was the queen bee at dawn
began that humming creed:
alive alive.

Sister Maura

The Cresset

The Insanity Defense
Guilty by Reason of Hinckley?

Bruce Berner
Anyone who believes that the criminal process is
merely a conveyor-belt scheme for dealing with the
seamy side, and not a lens for continuous, fierce moral
struggle, may well rethink the matter in light of John
Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal and the ensuing reaction. One
cannot ordinarily measure the strength of society's collective retributive impulse when a highly visible defendant is convicted; indeed, it is the function of the
criminal conviction to channel that impulse in a moreor-less civilized way. "Hinckley's been convicted," we
might have said. "Good. Let us get on to Bobby's ballgame." The acquittal, however, uncovered the depth of
fear, rage, and moral indignation, now without institutionalized expression, within all of us. Like electricity deprived of its destination, these emotions broke
out in all directions seeking new outlets for their energy.
Nor can this reaction be wholly accounted for by the
fact that President Reagan was the intended victim.
Clearly, Hinckley is viewed in part as a surrogate for
all perpetrators of violence, Reagan, Brady and the
others as surrogates for the potential victim in all of
us, and the acquittal as symptomatic of a system that
cannot deal with crime. If the President is not exempt
from such violence, can anyone feel safe?
Frustrated by the outcome, many people seemed to
say, "If John Hinckley isn't guilty, then someone or
something else is." Nothing escaped completely unsullied- the jury, psychiatry, the criminal process in
general, and, above all, the insanity defense.
The most immediate attack was on the individual
jurors. As I listened to the call-in shows the evening of
and day after the verdict, with caller after caller registering outrage and shock at the outcome, it occurred
to me that many of the callers' comments presupposed
that the jurors in the Hinckley trial had been shipped
in from Venus. They did not know that "defendants

Bruce Berner is Associate Professor in the Valparaiso University School of Law. He holds both the B.A. and LL.B.
from Valparaiso and the LL.M. from Yale. His article, "The
Bill of Rights and the Restraint of Government," appeared
in the October, 1979 Cresset. He also has published articles
in the Valparaiso University Law Review and contributed
a chapter on bankruptcy to Real Estate Practice in Indiana,
published by the Indiana Committee on Legal Education.
September, 1982

just claim to be insane to get off the hook" or that "psychiatrists and lawyers are really streetwalkers in expensive suits" or that "everybody is a little insane,
really." (Some of the callers provided persuasive evidence for this last point.) But a case against the jurors
could not long be maintained. It became clear (largely
because this jury was uncharacteristically vocal) that
the jurors were not ingenues, that they had not brought
less to their decision than the callers, but more. Street
wisdom was not lacking, but it had been tempered by
the solemnity attendant upon making a morally serious
judgment. Juror Nathalia Brown stated during deliberations, "The issue is not whether he was a little off, or
whether this poem or that one didn't make sense. He
shot those people, he shot them on purpose, he planned
the whole thing out. He should be punished. What
gives here! The man is just a manipulator. Ain't nothing
wrong with him." This lady ain't from Venus, either,
but she ultimately voted to acquit.

The Moral Issue of Responsibility
The frustration focused on the insanity defense,
aided by the statement of juror Maryland Copelin,
who closed the jury's defense by saying: "We felt locked
in by the law." The law that locked in Ms. Copelin and
the others is the insanity defense. Overnight, movements in scores of forums arose to abolish or weaken
the defense. My purpose herein is to examine the fundamental underpinnings of the insanity defen e, to evaluate the various proposals being made for its modification, and to suggest one change myself. My thesis
is that all current proposals either misunderstand, or
are willing for expediency's ake to jettison, the core
idea of a criminal law by ignoring or hiding the moral
issue of responsibility. The propo al mad h r in i to
implement an old, but untried, approach which presents the moral que tion with a clarity that cannot b
sidestepped.
The most radical propo al, already adopt d in two
states (Idaho and Montana) i abolition of th in anity
defense. This solution i a traightforward in trumental
attack on the perceived problem of violent offender .
Although this solution draw great political impetu
from the Hinckley ca e it i a dangerou olution,
negates the ba ic purpo e of the riminal law and r t
7

The criminal process's value as a technique for deciding highly charged moral issues is
weakened, if not destroyed, when used as the a/I-purpose agency of social control.

on a tacit premi e which i imply not tru . If a man
had leprosy, surely we would i olate him to pr
nt
contamination of others. While thi ma not b fair to
him in a very trict sen e hi confinement a an in trument for the public good i clearly defen ible. But
unless we held fast to earlier cultural notion that hi
disease was a manifestation of some grave per onal in,
we would not see as necessary a ritual of moral condemnation. A criminal conviction is of cour e ju t
such a ritual. The eminent cholar Henry Hart helped
expose the 1950s myth that the peno-correction proce
was the rehabilative technique of a compassionate ociety by stating "What distinguishe a criminal from a
civil sanction and all that distingui hes it ... i the
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition." Of course it is more
difficult to diagnose insanity than leprosy, and mistakes will be made, but it is as necessary today as ever
before, from a moral standpoint, to distinguish between
people who are sick and people who are bad.
None of this proves that the dangerously insane need
not be confined, like the leper. Of course he must, but
it perverts the criminal process (and thus weakens it
for all purposes) to make it do the job. Involuntary
commitment procedures are available in all jurisdictions; in most, a criminal acquittal on grounds of insanity automatically triggers such a process.
The criminal process's value as a technique for deciding highly charged moral issues is weakened, if not
destroyed, when used as the all-purpose agency of
social control. Note that 50 per cent of the police and
prosecutorial resources in this country are expended
to fight gambling, prostitution, and low-level drug
traffic. The main "benefit" from this is the alienation
of large groups of people who do not adopt the law's
morality as their own. In fact, the abolition of the insanity defense is even worse. Although people may
honestly disagree about the morality of gambling, I
am aware of no current serious argument that people
who act as a result of mental illness are morally culpable. Moreover if the criminal proce s were to be used
a a wide-ranging body for social control, it could not
work with its current rules. The accused is given a professional representative whether he can afford one or
not, proof i required "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
and the deci ion is made by a jury of twelve. We cannot
solve too many ocial problems with o cumber ome an
apparatus a this. A a matter of fact the rules and
trappings of a criminal trial would appear ab olutely
ridiculou to u were we not per uaded that conviction
carried a powerful moral pronouncement about the accu ed and that uch pronouncement are only tragically
made to innocent per on .
nother propo al-to remove in anity question from
8

th
n an-

uff rin
mpl t 1 any
pr po al, how
r mak the
criminal pro e
il t pha
de i ned
to deal with moral qu tion , now avoid the mo t
fundamental on of all. Th criminal pr c
ab olutely
dep nd on an imag of man fr e to make choices.
Many recognized defen
uch a
If-def n , <lure ,
or accident, indicat that w are not intere ted in punishing conduct which was not the function of choice,
or in which choice was re tricted among intolerable
alternative . The notion of a eparate system for juveniles rest on the understanding that anti- ocial actions
by certain people indicate therapeutic, not retributive,
response. To suggest the culpability of those who act
wholly from illne s, illness which by its nature excludes
all socially-tolerable choices, is to suggest that individual
fault is foreign to the inquiry. Perhaps even worse, it
might suggest that people are ultimately to be blamed
for their illnesses.

Burying the Essential Moral Question
The proposal of a new verdict form- "guilty but
mentally ill" (GBMI)-already law in six states, including Indiana, will, I think, become law in most
jurisdictions. When GBMI is in force, a jury in a criminal trial in which insanity is interposed, is given four
choices of verdict: 1) "not guilty"; 2) "not guilty by
reason of insanity"; 3) "guilty"; and 4) "GBMI." The
defendant found "GBMI" is, for all purposes, deemed
guilty of the offense. He is, however, "evaluated" to
determine whether he should begin his term in jail or
in a mental institution. If he is sent to the latter, and is
at any time prior to the expiration of his term released
therefrom, he is returned to the prison population to
finish his term. The idea is beguiling-the mentally
ill defendant is given treatment for his problem but
cannot be released into society any more quickly than if
he had been found "guilty." It seems a nice finesse of a
very difficult problem.
Closer examination shows that this proposed solution is either entirely meaningless as a response to the
perceived problem or, like earlier proposals, buries
the moral question. When the jury is asked to decide
from among these four outcomes, it is given the legal
tests both for "insanity" and for 'mental illnes ." The
test for in anity most prevalent today (it is the law of
The Cresset

It should be noted that "insanity" is not a medical, psychiatric, or clinical term. It is
strictly the stating of a legal outcome. The only unmistakable symptom of insanity is acquittal.

Indiana and al
f th Hin kl y ca e) is: "A per on is
not r pon ibl for havin n a ed in prohibited conduct if, a a r ult f m ntal di a e or defect, he lacked
sub tantial capacit ith r to appreciate the wrongfulnes of th onduct or to onform hi conduct to the requirement of th law." (" ub tantial-capacity" test).
The jury r fer to thi to decid whether or not the defendant i "not guilty by rea on of insanity." In determining whether the defendant is "GBMI," the jury
is instructed: "mentally ill means having a psychiatric
disorder which ub tantially disturb a person's
thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs a person's
ability to function and includes mental retardation."
The jury must visualize the class of persons who are
"mentally ill" as larger and wholly inclusive of the
class of "insane" persons. Definition of the mentally ill
class does not, however, expressly exclude those who are
"insane." If the defendant is "mentally ill" but not
"insane," the jury's task is clear. If the jury believes
the defendant is "insane," however, it is not told the
basis for deciding between "not guilty by reason of insanity" and "GBMI." If the jury were told that the
proper outcome in such cases was "not guilty by reason
of insanity," then GBMI is hardly going to cure Hinckley-like results. On the other hand, if "insane" persons
can be found "GBMI," the insanity defense is de facto
abolished. The jury is appeased into believing the defendant will not really be punished, but treated. As a
matter of fact, there is no guarantee that a defendant
found GBMI will receive any treatment in a mental
institution.
One final proposal would shift the burden of proof
on the sanity question to the defendant. Indiana, for
example, requires the state to prove everything else
"beyond a reasonable doubt," but requires the defendant to prove insanity by a "preponderance of the
evidence." With all respect, the only purpose for this
change, which runs contrary to the notion that criminal
punishment ought depend on community judgment
"to a moral certainty" and not merely when we are
"confused" about moral questions, and which begins
to erode the accusatorial style of Anglo-American
criminal trials by forcing defendants to "disprove"
guilt, is to change outcomes. It is based only on the
speculation that "too many" defendants are acquitted.
The often-heard complaint that a defendant need
only plead insanity and the jury will become so confused as to acquit simply is not empirically supportable. If one asks experienced criminal defense counselthe people, after all, most clearly "in the marketplace"
for defenses-he will be told that insanity is the defense
of last resort. It is such both because juries are traditionally reluctant to accept it and becau e, in many
cases, the penalty for insanity is less de irable to the
September, 1982

defendant than the penalty for the crime. One way to
test this is to search your memory for any case in which
the defense was raised to a charge other than murder
or its attempt, the crimes carrying the highest penalty.
In fact, the Hinckley case is one of only a very few in
which the defense was interposed to attempted murder.

Moral, Psychiatric, and Legal Aspects
My proposal is not to discard nor obscure the moral
question of responsibility but to make it more clear to
the jury that such is precisely what they are supposed
to decide. In an insanity-defense case, three components
must be managed. First there is a moral component, the
decision of who is and who is not deserving of punishment. While this judgment may be shared to some extent, it is the jury which answers the que tion at its
core. Second, a clinical, or medical, or psychiatr£c component represented by expert witnesses is needed to
inform the moral judgment. The legal component has
two main tasks, each of which it carries out through the
expression of a "test" for insanity and through rule
on expert testimony. One task is to provid a standard
for decision to insure equality across cases, though
surely this "test" is itself informed by the moral judgment. The second, and perhaps more important, task
is to mediate between the moral and the psych£atn:c
components so that each operat properly within it
sphere but does not impinge on the oth r. My contention is that the law does not do this very well-that
instead, the psych£atn·c component t nds to overpower
the moral one in many cases.
Note first that "insanity" is not a m dical p ychiatric, or clinical term. It i trictly the tatin of a legal
outcome. The only unmi takabl ymptom of in anity
is acquittal. A p ychiatri t has no gr at r laim, nor do
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--only
Th e range from perfect mental health (picture an Eastern mystic sitting, registering
) .
. delta
waves for days on end) to complete mental disintegration (watch Gong Show reruns , a contmuum.

most want one, to state a per on i an or in an than
anyone else. In his daily work he doe not u th t rm
because it is of no use to him; the rang from p rf t
mental health (picture an Ea tern my tic itting r i tering only delta waves for day on end) to compl t
mental disintegration (watch Gong how rerun ) i a
continuum, marked by signpo t , to be sure, but containing no bright lines. If you asked a p ychiatri t
whether or not a particular subject wa in ane he would
ask you first what you meant by the term and, econd
"for what purpose do you a k ?" The law mu t strike a
proper balance between commtU1ity morality (represented by the jury) and clinical data (delivered by expert witnesses). Currently, partly because of the uncertainties of the science of psychiatry and partly because of the law's inattention to the problem, the expert's
testimony often drifts away from purely clinical
material and begins to intrude on the moral question.
This situation came about only slowly. Until the 1950s,
the insanity instruction in most jurisdictions foreclosed
almost all useful clinical input. The chief problem was
that the "M'Naghten" instruction-which described
as insane only those who, because of mental disease or
defect, "could not tell right from wrong"-took account
only of cognitive impairment, and, even then, only
cognitive impairment of an excessive and unusual
kind. The defendant who knew he was acting wrongfully but could not, because of illness, control his actions
was convicted. The psychiatric community complained
that their testimony was foreclosed by a definition which
was foreign to their understanding of the problem.
Most defects, they said, were volitional defects. The law,
they said in effect, was asking the wrong question. The
reaction of individual psychiatrists differed. Some
refused to act as expert witnesses from a feeling that
they could not, and would not, shed light on the wrong
question. Others, surely with the aid of lawyers, began
to fudge their testimony. Once they were themselves
convinced that the defendant should not be held responsible, they began tailoring their testimony to the "rightwrong" test. If the law insisted on asking the "wrong"
question the witness would answer the "right" question
to him elf and then translate it into "wrong" language.
In this lay a terrible potential which soon came to
full flower. The "right" question-should the defendant
be held responsible?-is not a clinical question at all,
but a moral one. The preci e question which the jury
wa on hand for wa being answered by someone else.
Under cover of clinical jargon, many psychiatrists
muggled in their own moral outlook on responsibility.
And since the p ychoanalytic image of man i relatively
a more deterministic one, the bia was toward acquittal.
The chief problem wa that the te timony did not ound
like it e idenced a moral outlook· it ounded like di-
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p yp y-

work of the 'ri ht-wrong" in tru tion. Wh n a counting
for th " ide di parit of p y hiatric opinion , mo t
point to the fact that m ntal h alth and mental illne s
are elu iv oncept , that variou chool of thought
have ari en, that th mind of man is, after all a complicated thing. After accounting for all thi , there i till
more disagreement among p ychiatrists inside the court
room than out. The rea on is that outside they pursue
answers to clinical and therapeutic que tion . Inside,
moral judgments are mixed in.

The Idea of ..Substantial Capacity"
The call of the psychiatric community and others
for a more modern in anity instruction was finally answered in most jurisdictions by the adoption of the
"substantial capacity" test which both introduced volitional defect as the basis for insanity and removed the
absolutist language of the "right-wrong" test for cognitive defect. Psychiatrists are now free to give a greater
range of clinical evidence since evidence tending to
show volitional defect is no longer ruled inadmissable
as irrelevant. But, and this is an important but, the new
test for insanity, while it permits more clinical information, is not itself a clinical question. When one reads
it, the word "substantial" jumps off the page. That
word, at first blush a term of quantity or quality or both,
is ultimately a term of judgment. To illustrate, my fiveyear-old son Karl, when he wants more milk than usual,
asks for "too much milk." I keep trying to explain to
him the difference between a term of quantity- like
"eight ounces of milk"-and terms of judgment-like
"too much milk"-but he persists. (I think he understands it now but likes to hear the lecture.)
Precisely the same mistake is made when a psychiatrist is asked to render an opinion on whether or not a
given defendant had the "substantial" capacity to know
wrongfulness or to conform conduct. The word substantial only has meaning if there is an external referent. If I asked a psychiatrist whether X has the substantial mental stability to work in a nuclear plant, I would
not take "no" as inconsistent with his earlier opinion
that X had the substantial mental stability to drive a car.
The Cresset

When we ask the .. substantial-capacity" question, what is at bottom being asked is whether the
defendant's capacity was substantial enough to visit on him moral responsibility for his conduct.

Wh n w a k th
ub tantial- apacity" question in a
criminal trial , what i at b tt m b ing a ked is whether
the def ndant' apa ity wa uh tantial enough to visit
on him th moral r p n ibility for his conduct. When
the p ychiatri t i a k d thi qu tion , he is being asked
to shift from 1vm clinical data to making a moral
judgment. h wor t part of thi i that the hift is not
noticed by the jury. H appear rather to be making a
scientific interpretation from fact . Of course it is absolutely neces ary if w are to understand him at all, for
a psychiatri t to make interpretive judgments about
the clinical data at hand. What must be kept clearly in
focus, however, i the distinction between interpretation wholly within the r alm of expertise and the moral
judgment which is the peculiar province of the jury.
To clarify, consider an expert at accident reconstruction, with a physics background, being asked to estimate, from hard data found at the scene of an automobile
accident, the speeds at which the involved vehicles
were traveling when they collided. After testifying to
the length of skid marks, the type of road surface and
tires involved, after a dazzling exposition of the theory
of "conservation of momentum," and after some disclaimer based on uncontrollable variables, the expert
finally tells us that in his opinion vehicle A was traveling 30 miles an hour and vehicle B was traveling 20
miles per hour. I believe him so far, don't you? But now
he is asked if, in his opinion, vehicle A was traveling
"too fast." He wouldn't be allowed to testify, but even
if he were, why. should we do more than feign polite
attention? "Too fast" is either a strictly legal question
which we can resolve by looking at the posted speed
limit, or a prudential ( even slightly moral) question
about how to drive. The important thing to note is that
even if the expert testifies that 30 m.p.h. is or is not
"too fast," the jury is not misled into believing that
such is a scientific opinion. Rather the jury feels confident in overruling that interpretation if it disagrees
with it.
It might be argued that this analogy is unfair because
the science of psychiatry does not admit of such precise
quantitive or qualitative analysis, that much more depends on interpretation. This, however, suggests that
it is even more important in connection with psychiatry
to restrict the expert to his given field since there is
no quantity or quality within the jury's experience
against which to measure such interpretation. The jury
may believe our accident reconstructionist, but only
because it agrees with his interpretation. When the jury
agrees with the psychiatrist, it is sometimes because it
understood nothing at all of what he said. This is of
course compounded by the fact that with the psychiatri t
"facts" are often the product of interpretation and not
the basis for it.
September, 1982

A cardinal rule at common law stated that no witness,
expert or otherwise, could testify to an "ultimate issue
of fact." Th 11s, while an eyewitness to a collision might
state that the driver "was traveling 80 miles per hour,"
or "swerved across the center line," he could not testify
that the driver was "negligent" if such was an ultimate
issue in the case. This rule has been largely discarded
and I only wish to say that my proposal bears no intention of reviving it. If the ultimate issue is a question of
physics, a physicist should be permitted to answer it
(though, as always, the jury may choose to answer it
differently). If it is a question of psychiatry, a psychiatrist should likewise be permitted to state his opinion.
My point is only that the ultimate issue of insanity is
a moral question and thus, referable solely to the jury.
Although there appears no ideal solution, I submit
that a scheme for managing the insanity defense
approaches the currently optimal solution when it
satisfies these criteria: 1) it permits the widest possible
range of expert psychiatric te timony on matters within
such special expertise; 2) it forecloses psychiatric testimony on matters outside such expertise; 3) it as igns
the question of moral responsibility exclu ively and unproblematically to the jury.

The "Justly-Held-Responsible" Test
To this end, I suggest two change . Fir t, th judg
must not permit any interpr tive judgment of an expert without a full prior expo ition of the data on which
it is based; moreover, the expert may not give an opinion expressed in the language of the in anity definition .
Second, the instruction on in anity hould r ad: "
person is 'insane' if, a a re ult of m ntal di a or d feet, he cannot be justly held re pon ibl for hi conduct."
The jurors are further instructed that th pro ution
must prove sanity beyond a r a onable doubt and that
they should con ider all the te timony but not l av . it
untested against their own common n e and lif xp rience. This "justly-held-r pon ibl " t ·t i a
nturyold idea which never went furth r than a ad mia. (I
wouldn't bet the ranch on it goin anywh r
1
either.) When put forth in th pa t, h w v r th upporting argument wa that in anit "a a lini al matt r
was not yet well-enough und r t d t p rmit a b tt r
definition. It wa propo d in d p ration. I upport
it, instead, because it i not a g od clini al d finiti n
because it ubordinate all lini al int rpr tati n
moral judgm nt.
Te ting ' ju tly-h ld-r p n ibl ' a
tated crit ria, u h ch m off r gr at latitud to
te timony. Both cogniti
and
litional d f t
relevant; the exp rt ma \ ith pr
opinion on th quantit r qualit
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it in each r ard. ot onl ma h t ti ; full ' t
th e matt r , but hi t timon i n
jargon foreign or in oh r nt to him . H
that th d f ndant cannot t 11 ri ht from , r n
that defendant 'ha ub tantial capa it , ' but h i
forced to iew th probl m in th
t rm . h
criterion i m t b cau no e, p rt i p rmitt d tor nd
an opinion on wheth r the defendant ma b ju tl
held re pon ible for hi conduct.
to th third riterion, the moral que tion of re pon ibilit i put
quarely to the jury.
One objection to uch an open-ended in tru tion
put forth by braham Gold t in of th Yal La.., cho l
in his book The Insanit Defense, i that it gi
th jury
no guidance, lea es it p ychologically naked with no
impression that it follow , and thu can draw protection
from, a legal tandard. The fact i that the ' ub tantialcapacity" test really gives no guidance either though it
may give the fal e impre sion of doing o. The effect
of that false impression may, in some ca e , lead the jury
to abdiGate its responsibility to expert witnes e or to
the meaningless words of a "test" for insanity. Although
we would ordinarily prefer a clearer standard to a vague
one, the issue is simply not amenable to more clarity
without the serious side effects noted earlier.
One other feature of the open-ended instruction is
important and sets it apart from all other suggested
modifications. Those who argue for new "tests," new
"verdicts," or new "burdens" begin with the premise,
sometimes expressed but often not, that the prevailing
rules generate either too many acquittals or too few.
The move from "right-wrong" to "substantial capacity"
was prompted by a belief that the former, because it
excluded the volitionally-incapable, convicted people
it should not. The GBMI verdict was clearly a reaction
to acquittals of notorious defendants. I do not know
whether the "justly-held-responsible" instruction will
produce more acquittals than any other scheme or less,
and it is not the intention of the proposal to do either.
The number of acquittals depends on the community's
sense of morality as expressed through its representative, the jury. The acquittal rate may fluctuate with
new insights from psychiatry and as public opinion on
the i sue ebbs and flows. Such fluctuation is not pathological- it shows that the moral dialogue continues
unaffected by artificial determinants.
One cannot even tell whether or not the "justly-heldresponsible" test would have changed the Hinckley
outcome. Juror Copelin could not so easily claim that
the jury was "locked in by the law." My own guess is
that the result would not have been different. I don't
think the jury was "locked in" by the law; prosecution
expert witnesse had testified that Hinckley did have
substantial capacity. Perhap they were locked in by a
belief that conviction in uch a case was not morally
defen ible. Under the open-ended ju tly-held-re ponsible ' test, such belief is all that can or hould e r
lock a jury in.

Ground Zero
\

1

ar n h r
ur an h r i

th wm
fon
of man aft moon
lide
along ordinary wall .
Thi i the final emblem.
We are on harbor-watch
under a orrow
of metaphors.

Nun's Secret
She offered her Savior
the laminated circles
of her winterbreath.
She offered him
this counterpoint
to her darkened spirit.
Her prayer, enigmatic,
was hidden like an undergrowth
of bark. She prayed:
Let me walk with Your shadow.
Let me know.
And now, late at night,
her hands dare enfold
in the presence of the unseen.
These hands
that touch the untouched,
are the essence of her prayer.

Rudolf Wittenberg

~=

12

The Cresset

The Noblest Game
Education as Play and the Fall into Serious Work

Conrad Hyers
ccording to on th eory play constitutes a training of the young
creatur for th s riou work that life will demand later on. According to another it rves as an exercise in restraint .. . or in th e
desire to dominate or comp te.
All the e hypothe e have one thing in common: they all start
from the assumption that play mu st serve something which is not
play . Yet ature. so our reasoning mind tells us. could just as easily
have given her children all those u eful functions ... in the form of
purely mechanical exerci es and reactions. But no. she gave us play.
with it tension. its mirth . and its fun .

J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens1
For most students the word "study" is synonymous
with work. The studious student conjures up images of
nearsightedness, reclusive habits, and midnight oil.
Study has long since lost its original Latin meaning of
"zeal." Play, on the other hand, is what one does outside the classroom and library and laboratory: on weekends, in dorms and unions, at parties. Play is a release,
a temporary reprieve, from classwork and labwork and
homework. And it is play that one expects to do zealously.
Education, therefore, is placed from the start in the
category of work. It is concerned with requirements, assignments, testings, certifications, ordeals, toil. When
one adds the usual motivation for entering the halls
of higher education - namely, to train for a professional
career, and preferably one that is high-paying-education becomes serious work indeed. And when one further adds a tightening job market, economic uncertain ties, tuition costs, parental pressures, and
1

Johan Huizinga. Homo Ludens (Boston : Beacon Press . 19 50 ). pp . 2.
3.
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the accompan ing reflections on liberal arts education.
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inevitable student anxieties, the fundamental character of education and the liberal arts is threatened.
The origin of education, particularly in the liberal
arts tradition, is not in ~ork, but play, not in studiousness but zeal for learning, not in training for employment but love of wisdom. Education is, in the first place,
a leisure-time activity. One needs to be exempted from
the work force, and to be free from the immediate necessities of providing food, shelter, and clothing, in order
to participate in education. Education is a luxury enjoyed by those who, for the time being, do not have to work.
Education, furthermore, is born out of play. It is the
result of the capacities of the human mind to go beyond
sheer biological rhythms and physiological necessities:
to play with existence. Most, if not all , human culture
is a superaddition to the basic physical requirements
of survival and preservation of the species. And education is the learning, elaboration, and re-creation of this
human culture.
Animals have enough brainpower to get by and get
the job of survival done, given their ecological niches.
But humans have such a considerable surplu to play
with that, if it is not played with, one of the most common human problems is that of boredom. We are not
satisfied simply to tear off chunk of the carca ses of
gazelles and then lie in the un or hade until the pan
of hunger begin to stir us again. Wheth r primitive or
modern hunter, we feel compelled to surround our
hunting with all sort of ymbols, myth , ritual , cu toms, and meanings. We mu t d corate the hunter ,
decorate the weapon , decorate th meat, decorate th
eating place, and decorate the trophy- or decorat
with it. W must cook the kill and in a c rtain way. W
must eat it in a certain manner, with certain in truments, held in certain way , at certain tim , in rtain
places, with certain peopl , uppl m ented by c rtain
other food , con urned in certain ord r and ombinations, and accompani d by certain kind of conver ation, dres , furnitur , mu ic, Ii hting, mann r , and
prayer.
Even the imple r quir ment of eatin for urvi al
is turn d into an elaborate a th ti , thi al
and religiou gam , with rul and t l
a varied a th vari t of human ultur
on
ha anything dir ctl to do , ith th phy iolo
e tion and ab orption. And , t
mp und th proc
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Education at its best is an education in the inexhaustible variety of play-forms, past
and present, and in the playfulness that gave, and continues to give, them birth.

after we have eaten we con ider our el
to ha e
repleni hed our energy for all ort of other a ti iti
mo t of which al o have little to do with the nee 1tI
of life and urvival. Yet thi playing with all ar a of
life opens up an infinity of po ibiliti of b having
perceiving, and interacting. As Huizinga argued o
ma terfully in Homo Ludens, human culture in all it
incredible variety of forms i the re ult of thi human
capacity to play with exi tence. Give a dog a box and it
will chew on it; give a child a box and it will be transformed into a doll-house, a castle, a toy chest a zoo
for stuffed animals, an automobile.
Education, therefore, at its best is an education in
the inexhaustible variety of play-forms, past and present, and in the playfulness that gave, and continues to
give, them birth. But-and here's the fly in the soupwhen the sense of play is lost, education becomes work.
It becomes serious business, and the very imagination
and fascination and delight which made these forms possible is dulled and constricted. Education ceases to be
what it literally is: re-creation and recreation. Eating
of the tree of knowledge turns into a laborious toiling
by the sweat of one's brow, beset by thorns and thistles,
and the birth-pangs of learning.
But there is another eating of the tree of knowledge,
a sweeter fruit. Many different interpretations have
been advanced concerning the fall of Adam and Eve. I
should like to propose yet another one, and that is that
the fall is a fall into seriousness and work. The first
clue that pointed me in this direction came, not from
the biblical version, but from a Jicarilla Apache tale of
the Indian Adam and Eve.
According to this tale, the animals came to the Creator
and said, "We need someone like you to stay with us."
So the Creator took white clay and iron ore and red
ochre, along with pollen and gems and algae, and created a man. When the figure came to life it was lying
face downward. So the Creator told the man to sit up,
and he sat up. Then he told him to shout, and the man
shouted. He said, "Speak," and the man spoke. Finally
he said, "Laugh," and the man began to laugh. On
seeing the man laugh, the dog was glad, and jumped
up on the man and ran about wagging his tail happily.
The birds too, on seeing the man and hearing him
laugh, began to chirp and ing.
Then the animals said "We now have a man but the
man has no companion. It is not good that man should
be alone. ' So the Creator put ome lice on the head of
the man cau ing him to cratch. The cratching caused
him to fall asleep. While he slept he dreamed of another
er ature, like yet unlik him. nd when he awakened,
b hold, the dream had come tru .
young woman
wa sitting be ide him. He poke to her and to hi urpri e, he poke back. He touched her and he touched
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uall , a
iat
concern with riou n
work of the Creator who work d ix day and r t d the
e enth. Religion i
riou bu ine a are all fundamental que tion concerning the good, th true, and the
beautiful. The pirit of pla and !aught r, th r fore ,
belong on the p riphery of life. To th center of life
belongs the pirit of gravity obriety, tudiou ness.
Theologians, moralists, and educator have had a
great many eriou and laborious things to say about the
responsibilities of seriousness and labor, but very little
about the re ponsibilities of laughter and playfulness.
Despite copious efforts devoted in Western culture to
the meaning of being created in the image and likeness
of the Creator, almost nothing has been said about
laughter and playfulness as aspects of this imago dei,
let alone as important and distinctive human attributes.
The impression is given that laughter is the creation of
the devil or a fumbling demiurge, or that play is a pale
substitute for the more holy joys of paradise.
The Greek philosophers were closer to the truth in
characterizing human beings as laughing animals (zoion
gelastikon), and seeing in playfulness and a sense of the
comic distinctive badges of humanity (homo ludens and
homo risens). It was Lucian of Samosata who in Sale of
Creeds described the special genius of the paripatetic
philosopher as that of being able to distinguish a man
from an ass, the one capable of laughter and playfulness, the other only of braying.
It is, after all, seriousness that we share with the
animals; in laughter we laugh alone, and only in a very
preliminary sense with chimpanzees. The simple fact
is that the most highly trained or domesticated animals
neither get the point of a single pun or witticism, nor
devise any of their own. They do not even, like the proverbial Englishman, get the point of the joke and laugh
a day later.
Similarly, we may share in a preliminary way in the
playfulness of young animals. Tiger cubs can be quite
playful but as the tiger matures, this playfulness diminishe . Humans, however have a capacity for playfulness that can be just as alive at age 80 as age 8. It
may be more on the side of mind than body and pirit
than fle h, but it is thereby able to become even more
creative and enriching. The comedian George Burns at
85 may not have been able to move about a quickly as
The Cresset

Children are potty-trained; but this is not education. Training is essentially work. And the work
of training is extrinsically motivated; it requires rewards and punishments in order to succeed.

h did wh n in hi h nti
but the twinkle in the eye,
the ima ination th playfuln
and humor were just
as liv 1
v r. H wa ev n in hi Os, capable of
playin G d (in Oh God). On thinks also of Alfred
orth Whiteh ad wh wh n he retired from an illustriou car er in the fi ld of mathematic , took up philo ophy, and had an v n more illustrious career to
the age of 6.
If life b come simply eriou business, if one loses
a en e of humor and play, one joins the ranks-not of
saints and age - but of old gorillas and baboons. It is
really a much in laughter a in seriousness, in playfulness as in work-and in the playfulness of humorthat human being are differentiated from the animal
kingdom. In theological terms, laughter, humor, and
playfulness, like imagination and wonder, are an important part of what it means to speak of being created
in the image and likeness of God. The fall, therefore,
is a fall into seriousness and work; and we have taken
ourselves, our situations, our tasks and labors, our
beliefs and opinions, very seriously ever since. Friedrich Nietzsche, in the same passage of Thus Spake Zarathustra in which he exclaimed he "would only believe
in a god who could dance" -though he was never able
to locate such a god- nevertheless went on to identify
Satan as the one who is "serious, thorough, profound
and solemn ... the spirit of gravity, through whom
all things fall. ''2
I have taken another clue as to the meaning of this
fallenness from the average college classroom. Despite
all our talk about the advantages of a liberal arts education, the opportunities to explore new frontiers of knowledge, to discover hidden treasures in so many fields,
to soar on wings of imagination, to dive into the depths
of oceanic profundities, to eat at the banquet table of
wisdom-to cite the kind of embellished prose that
graces college catalogues- despite all such rhetoric,
the honest truth is that much of the time we insist on
turning this scintillating play of ideas into work.
Curriculum review committees come forth at regular
intervals to shuffle and reshuffle requirements and
programs, catalogue statements are revised , the latest
equipment purchased, new buildings erected, and libraries enlarged. But the central issue remains: How
does one rediscover and rekindle the play-element in
learning? When the spirit of play is gone, regardless
of the number of ingenious and expensive improvements, enthusiasm becomes tedium; marvel falls into
boredom; the excitement of a new discovery become
the ho-hum of yawning acquaintance; thoughtful reflection is reduced to note-taking; imagination i lim2

For a fuller account of laughter, humor, and the fall e Conrad Hyer .
The Comic Vision and the Christian Faith ( ew York : Pilgrim Pres .
1 81 ). Prologue and Ch . 1.
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ited to imagining what the next exam will be like;
and the sense of wonder shrivels to wondering whether
one will pass the course or not.
Even a small child knows that education is fundamentally play. It is learning for the sake of learning,
play for the sake of play. If it is not this, if it is not intrinsically valuable and significant, then it is not education but training. Children are also potty-trained; but
this is not education. Training is essentially work.
And the work of training is extrinsically motivated;
it requires rewards and punishments in order to succeed. The animal trainer trains ponies and lions and
seals to learn and repeat · the precise motions devi ed
for them by rewarding them with food when they obey,
and by striking them with a whip when they do not obey.
To the academic world these incentives are known as
the examination and grading system, leading to the
diploma and the job market. Such necessary evils should
not obscure the fact that education is its own reward.
It is entered into for its own sake. Learning it elf is
enjoyment and enrichment. Whereas training i a m ans
to an end, education is an end in itself. We study th
stars because there are star ; we study Shake peare
because there is a Shakespeare- and b cause we have
the studium, the zeal, to do so.
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This view does not imply that education, to be play, must be turned into a form of ent rt inment.
The temptation here is great, given the entertainment orientation of contemporary culture.

Though student pre umabl com to colleg f r a
liberal art education what i often ttl ed for i a kind
of animal training. E en a mall child i able to
beyond animal training becau e for the child learnin i
play and learning is fun. L arning new , ord i fun·
learning the name of things i fun; learnin to read i
fun; learning to create thing i fun· , nd e r and
imagination are fun. The fundamental context of human
learning is fun: laughter, play , and game. Imago Dei.
To be sure, there is an element of training involved
in learning. To learn to play a Beethoven onata one
must develop various technical skills. But if the pirit
of play is not the basic motivation, if the onata i not
intrinsically worth doing, then one will never ucceed
in playing a single sonata. This also does not mean that
learning is not difficult. Some of the mo t rewarding
accomplishments are those which are struggled at, puzzled over, sweated out. A part of the play is the risk
the intellectual challenge, the sense of adventure, the
feeling of achievement.
An analogy with the world of sports is instructive.
It is true that participants in a game may feel it necessary to justify their particular sport, and all the time,
energy, and money expended upon it, by arguing that
certain external goals are in fact achieved; teamwork,
physical fitness, character development, sportsmanship,
group pride, school spirit, even good citizenship. Yet
these are rationalizations for what requires no special
reasons or purposes to function and come into being in
the first place. The purpose of a game is to play the
game, and the motivation is that one likes to play that
sort of game. One may play football for the money and
the glory of Chicago, but if that is the point of playing,
the heart of the action is lost, and the freedom of the
game to be primarily for itself is forfeited.
William Dean, in his Love Before the Fall, has argued
that two of the major influences upon Western education, Greek and Hebraic thought, have tended to see
learning as instrumental and knowledge as utilitarian.
One learns in order to elevate the soul toward the forgotten realm of the eternal ideas (Plato) or in order to
fulfill the will of God on earth and to receive the knowledge necessary for salvation (Jesus). Learning and
knowing is for a purpose b yond it elf and that goal is
in an eternal or future realm. "The education in neither
instance is valuable in itself; it is valuable only as it
somehow improve the future by giving understanding
to one who was ignorant."3
One may imagine a great many other le s contemplative and religious goals for learning. nd they have
been imagined: improvement of charact r develop3

William Dean. Love Before th e Fall (Philadelphia: We tminster
Press. 1976 ), pp. 32 . 33 .
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i - fi ur in
inundat d , ith
tran u ,
ti n and th
ultin p rmplifi d m t r
ntl by
ding into bu in
major education i ith r dr " n d or turn d into o many
era h cour in th t chniqu of int 11 tual wimming.
he gr at ne d i to r affirm what William D an has
called "a p da ogy of purpo l n .' Such a pedagogy would ha
valu in and of it lf. It would be
" ufficientl elf-confid nt to a rt that education may
be valuable in the way that football and movies are
valuable that education need not neces arily be valuable exclusively in the way that calisthenics and brushing one' teeth are valuable." More like a concert, it
"would be appreciated, as concerts ordinarily are, primarily for it pre ent hearing."4
This view doe not imply that education, to be play,
must be turned into a form of entertainment. The temptation here is great, given the entertainment orientation of contemporary culture. "Educate me" often gets
translated as "Entertain me." The solution to the routine
and monotony of training is often thought- both by
teachers and students-to be one of amusement and divertisement: peppier, spicier, more popular approaches
to learning, of the same order as marketable television
programming. But this is to offer an external solution
to what is essentially an internal problem. Boredom is
primarily a subjective matter, even though it is usually
rationalized by crediting it to objective sources which
are said to be "boring": books, lectures, courses, subjects, tasks. Education is not a matter of trying to amuse
those whose principal contribution to the learning situation is that of bringing dullness and apathy with them,
like hollow cups waiting to be filled by some bubbling
elixir. The goal is not to achieve and maintain a fever
pitch of excitement, but to cultivate fascination and inquisitiveness. Education is not a kind of show business
juggling, but a juggling with ideas and possibilities
and relationships.
Children understand these things better than most
adolescents and adults. I recall when one of our children was in the second grade and had just been introduced to the multiplication table. I had come to give
him a ride home after school. When he got in the car
he could hardly wait to tell me about all the neat things
you can do with numbers, and all the new ways he had
di covered that you could play with number .
I also recall the day when I was asked to peak to a
4

Ibid .. p. 33 .
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fourth gr d
about Japan . I p k for 30 minute
p n d th r maind r f th hour for que h nd in th r m w nt up. They were
rn m r , timulat d b yond belief. Vi ions
r f th
ar a" ard danc d in my head . I
that aft m n t t a h a college class on
. H r it wa a diff rent tory.
o
man w ndrou ph nomena and marvelous
living curio iti
I dra ged aero
the room, there
were om tud nt for whom nothing could have been
mor borin
tud nt with blank tare and impassive
fac
on tud nt a 1 p and another tudent who appeared catatonic. Th re were ome students who
actually looked int re t d, two tudents who managed
a mile and one tudent with enough curio ity to a k
a question.
Thi i the fall into eriousne s and work. This is the
fall from education into training. Curiosity may kill
cats but the absence of curiosity kills education. And
when the only question one happens to get is, How
much of thi book do we have to read? or, What do we
have to know for the examination? one senses that education is dead, and that the liberal arts dream has faded
in the light of common day. For the liberal arts are
ba ed on the thirst for knowledge, the joy of learning,
the play of ideas, the sense of marvel and wonder, the
love of wisdom, the gift of imagination, the liberation
of the spirit. In education, as well as in religion, except
one turn and become like a little child, one cannot
enter this kingdom.
Even Plato hints at times in this direction:
What, then, is the right way of living? Life must be lived as play.
playing certain games, making sacrifices , singing and dancing ..
Every man and woman should live life accordingly, and play th e
noblest games and be of another mind from what they are at pre ent.
Plato. Laws, vii , 803

It is true, of course, that those who play at what they
do have less of a problem with tension, anxiety, meaninglessness, tedium, boredom, than others, and that they
are happier, more creative, productive, and fulfilled.
It is also true that students with a strong liberal arts
education are more enriched, well-rounded, imaginative, sensitive, and prepared for living than students
who have only been narrowly trained for a particular
vocation. But let us say these things in a whisper, and
as an aside. Though such grand results are the bait
and delight of college Admissions, Development, and
Placement offices, they smell strongly of training exercises and utilitarian sweat. To emphasize such goal
as the purpose of education, worthy as they are, and
therefore presumably worthy of all the time and money
invested in them, is still to lose sight of the intrin ic
values to be found in the learning proce it elf, and in
the sheer enjoyment of learning. Education at it highe t
and be t i for it own ake. It i the creation, appreciation, and celebration of knowledge. In hort education
is fun. It i the nobl t game.

Psalm from the Hemoglobin Ward
Yahweh, our brother lies heipless.
Terror swells a body
lumped with decay.
The hair of his head has fallen.
Sweat rises in sickening dew
from barren bone.
Light glows on the gourds
of his glands that declare
themselves grotesque.
Orderlies wait to lift him out
of the bag of VA hospital gown.
And his women wait,
wife, mother, sister, speechless,
crying in silence
Yahwehthe broken face of our brother
is the broken face of Christ:
ecce homo.

The Sign of Mark
Immediately i the cho en word of Mark.
He writes: Here begin the great good news
of Jesus Chri t, the on of God ; th dark
i pushed a ide by light. H e who would choo
to come in human fie h would grav ly 1 t
himself be baptiz d . t once, immediately,
the Spirit ratified th act. Th n J u m t
the brother , imon and ndr w. Immediately
they moored their boat and n t t f llow Him .
That' how it wa : a woman who wa ill ,
a paralytic man . .. h art-n d , n t whim
directed J esu . Mark breathed in mira 1

Importunate, he dram atiz d hi pl a:
Come to the on f od immediate(v.

Sister Maura

~=
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From
The
Chapel
Healing and the
Messianic Hope
Christa Ressmeyer Klein

And they brought to him a man
who was deaf and had an impediment
in his speech; and they besought
him to lay his hand upon him.
And taking him aside from the
multitude privately, he put his
fingers into his ears, and he
spat and touched his tongue; and
looking up to heaven, he sighed,
and said to him, "'Ephphatha,"
that is, ··se opened." And his
ears were opened, his tongue was
released, and he spoke plainly.

Mark 7 :32-35

Christa Ressmeyer Klein is Assistant
Professor of Church History at the Lutheran
Theological Seminary, Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania, where this sermon was preached.
She earned her B.A. at Valparaiso University
and her Ph.D. in American Civilization at
the University of Pennsylvania. She has
also studied at Union Theological Seminary.
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INI

ot until I r a h d hi h ho 1 ag did I limp the
p r on b hind th handi ap . P t had rebral pal y
and yet had led a r markable life. In fa t I cam to
vi whim a th mot ntur om of my relativ . H e
had acquired a doctorate in Philo ophy from th
niver ity of Cincinnati. He had come to Manhattan to find
work. ew Deal reform provided income when teaching job were not a ailable. He tried the Communist
party for a time, but remained too much of an agno tic
and skeptic for any ideological commitment. He was
there to di cu
hakespeare when I wa discovering
literature in high chool. And he was there to discuss
politics and loneliness when I moved to Manhattan
after college.
Pete died at 85 in 1979. Hi legacy to me was not so
much the memory of his accomplishments as an understanding about his condition. I learned from him about
the terrible tension: the division between the fierce will
to live and to succeed and the profound craving to die.
The option of suicide was never finally rejected. The
years of indignities could not be erased. More than
once Pete lifted his chin defiantly to say, "I cannot
accept my affliction."
For Pete to go on living with an unacceptable affliction was to despair. To imagine the release in death was
to hope. It was humbling for me who loved him so to
handle that bald fact that my love, and the love of
others who cared for him, could never satisfy. Ultimately, he yearned for healing. He would not be reconciled to his deformities. And if not healing, then he
would have death.
(I am reminded of the ending to the film, "The Elephant Man." John Merrick chooses to sleep like a normal person- his head down on a pillow- even though
he know he will suffocate under the weight of his deformed head. He has suffered indignities without end.
He will not capitulate to the voyeurism, the pity, or
even the respect of others, but instead wishes for another life, even in death.)
The Cresset

To forget the radical nature of Christian hope is to resign ourselves to the power of sin and
death. To make hope unphysical is to ignore the implications of the reign of God in t he risen Lord.

'I
ho ar fighting
word
n at arth, at elf. Even
tho
f u wh ar n t p rti ul rl di abled hare that
e aluati n f ur wn ari d ondition . We do not
a pt th fa t ab ut our bodie ; what the mirror a
a h m min ; ho w hav been conditioned
and ha
ho n to think about our elve . We live with
agin f atur p und in wrong plac , athletic muscles
gone lack womb worn or unu ed. ome of us have
congenital d f t th pro pect of hereditary diseases,
or illn
inhaled from a toxic environment. The
hadow of th
alley of Death grow longer as we grow
older and we are le candidate for a Miller High Life
beer comm rcial than mod ls for one of Pieter
Breughel' omber painting . In the sixteenth century
it wa not o ea y to forget that sickness and deformity
are the con equence of alienation from our Creator.
Breughel's painting are replete with the warted, the
obese, the crippled, the blind. And when we are not
bewailing our own condition, we are smugly eying
others and thanking God that we are not like them but often only because we are anxious that their afflictions could become ours or our children's.

If we are reminded daily of the physical consequences
of sin, we should have an ear ready to hear what Mark
has to say in today's Gospel about the physical character of hope. The man brought before Jesus is described
in the sparsest of terms. He is deaf, he has an impediment of speech. From the setting, it would appear that
he is Gentile. There is no mention of prior faith-only
physical need. Jesus does not deal with the man as if he
were an exhibit for the crowd, but deals with him privately. He fingers his ears, spits and touches his tongue,
looks to heaven, sighs and prays, "Be Opened." The
man is healed.
It is a ministry of healing quite different from what
we learn through the helping professions today. What,
e.g., might Jesus have done if he had just finished a
course in Clinical Pastoral Education (with a theologically-inept supervisor)? Might he not have said to the
deaf man with a speech impediment, "You too are a person and I accept you. Your defects do not define you.
Remember that always and feel fulfilled. And I will see
to it that you have good health care, speech therapy,
useful employment, good company-even hearing aids
in your church pews."
That is all well and good. That is what is humanly
possible. It ought to be done. And we don't do it very
well. The long overdue recognition in our society of
rights and needs of the handicapped pres e us further
to pursue what is humanly po ible. But J e us did not
September, 1982

accept that man in his affliction. He put an end to it. He
changed him. Acceptance may be a sign of human decency. But it is not a sign of the Kingdom.
That is why the crowd goes wild in Mark's account.
Jesus heals. And Mark would have us recall that. Healing is evidence of the dawn of the Messianic Age, the
coming of the Reign of God. In the words of our first
lesson from Isaiah 35:
Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened ,
and the ears of the deaf unstopped ;
Then the lame man leap like a hart.
and the tongue of the dumb sing for joy.

In the time of the Messiah the physical evidence of our
captivity to sin will be erased. Healing is a mark of the
New Age. Hope is embodied in the physical.
The crowd is "astonished beyond measure." But in
this age of the Risen Lord we should not be surprised.
A resurrected Lord who comes to us in bread and wine
even now touches our tongues. And we may, in Isaiah's
words, "sing for joy." This foretaste of the Kingdom reminds us that hope is phy ical even as sin's effects were.
To forget the radical nature of Christian hope is to
resign ourselves to the power of sin, sickness, and death.
To make hope unphysical is to ignore, to avoid the
implications of the reign of God in the risen Lord. The
charismatics' concentration on healing may embarrass
us and may be theologically sloppy, but the charismatics, at least, live with that hope which the world
calls foolish.
While such hope makes us uneasy because it violates
the decisions we have made about what is possible and
real, we are called to continue to harbor it, even while
we do what is only humanly pos ibl : while we recognize personhood in deformity give aid to the disabl d,
and provide access to the goods of thi earth. Or, to use
the words from our les on from James, while we continue to visit orphan and widow in th ir affliction.
At the same time, we dare not accept affliction a the
last word. or dare we depend on our rol a mm1 ter
to the afflicted for definition. That would b to make a
living off the tatu quo, the old er ation. W ar call d
to be like the crowd in th text- t o e tatic to k p a
ecret. The Me iah ha om with h aling on hi wing .
He ha done all thin w 11. W who are in him an dare
to voic that hop in th mid t of th h Ip w proff r
the hop that there will b indication for th oppr
d,
healing for th affli t d. For a R urre t d L rd pr mise that much.
Cl
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The Ironies of Art and Life

Norman Mailer, Jack Abbott, and The Executioner's Song
Harold J. Harris
It has become almost a commonplace to ay with
0 car Wilde, that rather than art imitating life it i
usually the other way round. What is hardly commonplace, though, is to see life making a monkey of art
or of a particular artist and his particular work of art
especially when the artist loudly proclaims him elf a
devotee of life and experience and his art to be a remarkably faithful transcription of life and experience.
Yet that is precisely what has happened to orman
Mailer, thanks to an ex-convict named Jack Abbott, who
by engaging in experience his way, rather than Mailer's,
has succeeded in forcing on the latter's The Executioner's Song a meaning and significance entirely other
than Mailer intended it to have.
The story of Mailer's relationship with Abbott has
been told in a number of different places, including the
New York Times and Time magazine, which published
an essay by Lance Morrow savagely and quite brilliantly skewering Mailer for his role in the whole proceeding. That part of the story which most interests
me has to do with Mailer's response to Abbott as man
and writer, a response that is set forth in the introduction that Mailer contributed to Abbott's book In the
Belly of the Beast. One of the themes that he develops
there is the parallel between Abbott and Gary Gilmour.
Both men, who Mailer of course knows to have committed murders, are regarded by him as among "the
best ... that are sent to prison ... the proudest, the
bravest, the most daring, the most enterprising, and the
most undefeated of the poor" (italics mine). Then there
is the fact that both men, according to Mailer, possess a certain literary talent, although Gilmour's did
not reach the proportions (take on the dimensions) of
a book. My guess, though, and in the nature of things
it can only be a guess, is that if Gilmour had not been
executed he would at some time or another have brought
out a book in the form of his and Nicole's letters, and
that Lawrence Schiller would have arranged for their
publication, with an introduction by Mailer.
In his essay "The White egro," written in 1957,

Harold J. Harris is Professor of English at Kalamazoo College in Kalamazoo Michigan. He has published in a wide
variet of journals. His article, "Two Imaginary Lectures
to My Students in Freshman Composi'tion " appeared i'n the
February, 1982 Cre set.
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Mail r op n d up a di tin tion b tw nth p y hopath
who murd r if h ha th coura - ut of th necesity to pur e hi iol nc 'and th 'two trong ighteenyear-old hoodlum "who impl for th mon b at in
the brain of a cand - tore owner. For the latter act,
he wrote courag of a ort i nece ary, for one murders not only a weak fifty-year-old man but an institution a well, on violate private property, one enters
into a new relation with the police and introduces a
dangerou element into one' life. The hoodlum is
therefore daring the unknown, and so no matter how
brutal the act, it is not altogether cowardly."

Neither Psychopaths nor Abstractions
Since Abbott presumably is not a psychopath and
the man that he murdered was not a storekeeping
symbol of bourgeois civilization but a young playwright making ends meet by working as a waiter, one
can only wonder about what Mailer made of Abbott's
sticking his knife into Richard Adan. After all, Adan
was a flesh-and-blood creature, not an abstraction or a
fiction designated by Mailer to make a point. The Executioner's Song is very far indeed from looking at Gilmour's victims as so many abstractions with considerably less than the life of the brave man who has taken
theirs, this despite the fact that Max Jensen and Ben
Bushnell are perfectly ordinary middle-class men
even if neither of them got as far as owning a store.
Read the long and detailed account of Gilmour's slaying
of Jensen and Bushnell and you will find nothing at
all derogatory about either of those perfectly ordinary, eminently decent men.
If the murdered men were as I described them-or,
as Mailer does, and I see no reason for calling into
question his description of them-then what are we to
make of the wholly remorseless man who killed them
for no better reason than that it was easier that way.
And here we come upon the curious irony that until
I read his introduction to Abbott's book it had not occurred to me that Gilmour was perhaps being cast in
the essentially heroic role Mailer fitted out for Abbottuntil, presumably, the after-hours knifing. In fact, in
the opening paragraph to the original, pre-Abbottknifing version of this paper, I wrote of The Executi'oner's Song a being "far from repre enting Gilmour as
the kind of existentialist hero that reader of the earlier
Mailer might have expected and a number of critics
The Cresset

If someone who is nasty, mean-spirited, capricious, willful, cruel, thoughtless, conniving, and

exploitative can be an existential hero, then the Gary Gilmour of Mailer's book qualifies.

of th bo k th u ht th y found .... The 'I' of Mailer'
book partl b cau of th u bdu d moral and social
valu , 1 k and und rath r little like the old exi t ntiali t-hip t r who back in the Fifties and Sixties
wa cavortin acr
th literary land cape."
If om on who i na ty, mean- pirited, capricious,
willful, cruel, thoughtle , conniving, and exploitative
can be an exi tential hero then the Gary Gilmour of
Mailer' book i eminent! y qualified for that designation.
Of cour e, though, there is the decided possibility that
Mailer who can hardly help be aware of Gilmour's pose ing th e qualities which are so abundantly displayed in the book, actually admires the capriciousness
and cruelty (the others it is simply inconceivable that
he would think well of), and regards them as going with
the existential territory. Much less likely, however, is
that Mailer himself sees, or wants his reader to see, as
admirable Gilmour's rather casual attitude toward the
black convict he had killed, or Gilmour's man-in-thestreet anti-semitism.
The Gilmour that emerges from Mailer's account
certainly is not without good qualities. (One thing that
he is not, or at least not so that it really matters, is poor,
which is how Mailer had characterized him when bracketing him with Abbott.) He is, for one thing, uncompromisingly honest about himself, even when that
honesty can only make others-and he knows it-look
upon him with revulsion. Moreover he is quite generous even if his generosity most often takes the form of
giving away what is not rightfully his, such as a six-pack
of beer that he has walked off with. Again, he possesses
more than a measure of courage that manifests itself
in a willingness to stand up to no matter what or who
the threat. It is even possible that he loves his younger
brother, and quite probably he loves his mother: at any
rate he is fiercely loyal to her, and absolutely determined that her conduct toward him will in no way be
called into question in order to provide some rationalization for his having lived his life as he has.
If there is, however, one quality above all others
that Mailer's Gilmour possesses, and which indeed
goes a long way toward explaining Mailer's decision to
write a book about him and the very kind of book that
The Executioner's Song is, it is Gilmour's literateness.
Not only does he exhibit a way with words in the dozens
of hours of taped interview that Larry Schiller arranges, but he does so as well in two near-literary media:
letters and poetry. (The "near" is meant to indicate
that while many letter and almost all poetry are in the
nature of thing literature, and while Gilmour' l tters
are more than the u ual or garden variety effort and his
poetic attempt are more than ver e in neither m dium
doe he effect that kind of verbal tran formation that we
think of a g nuin I literary.) Curiou ly enough,
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though, neither Gilmour's letters nor his efforts at poetry provide any greater insight into Gilmour the killer
than do the taped interviews he gave Larry Schiller.
Their two pervasive themes, most often intertwined, are
his love for Nicole and his belief in a spiritual world
where he is certain (so too is she) that he and his beloved
will be reunited for all eternity after his execution.
Perhaps spiritualism has called forth some able and
creative literary expositors, but if so, I do not know who
they are other than Yeats and, in The Magic Mountain,
Thomas Mann. Gary Gilmour, beyond expressing with
a certain eloquence his belief in the spirit world, makes
no new or interesting contribution of form or substance
to that literature.

Scatological Love Letters and Poetry
His writing on love reaches a slightly higher level,
if only because it bears more unmistakably the stamp
of his own strong, even powerful personality, and because it displays a much greater intensity. On the other
hand it is often crudely scatological (or anatomical)
and reads like second-rate Henry Miller, who is better
on the purely biological than he is on love as a linking
of mind and spirit and soul along with body.
That love has one meaning for a Gary Gilmour with
pen in hand and a very different one for a Gary Gilmour without it, is evident from a reading of the various
accounts of how he behaved toward the real-life a opposed to the epistolary icole. Everything that he himself tells us about his day-to-day treatment of her indicates the same completely in ensitive, completely
egotistic man incapable of even imagining how another
human being feels, much le conceiving of th other
as having want and needs and de ires a meaningful
as his own. Not that hi mi tress comes through any
better in this respect than Gilmour; her ca ual affairs
with about a dozen different men, affair that continu
while Gilmour await execution and write hi pas ionate love letters to which he replie in qually pa sionate term , and h r b drag led kid ith r dra
d
along behind her or 1 ft in automobil
whil their
mother pur ue her amatory adv nture -th
thing
do not argue for the "gr at lov 'or th exqui itely nsitiveloverproject db
ilmour' 1 tt r and int rvi w .
In fact if Mail r wer a diff r nt kind of journali t
he would very likely find him 1f makin u
of that
tri d-and-tru pair of adj ti
' qualid" and " ordid'
in rendering both ilmour and Gilmour' girl-fri nd
(a mor appo ite t rm r all than mi tr ). But Mail r
being Mailer and
ail r ha in mad a much of a
p ychic and a th ti in
tm nt in th wr tch d pair
a he ha h an hardl b
t d t I ok at th
term that mi ht w 11 b u
ew York Dail
ews
or a ational Enquirer r p rt r .
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The Executioner's Song makes no contribution whatever to the novel form: ind edit is on
the perverse side, the Pulitzer Prize committee notwithstanding, even to regard it
a novel.

\ h ther Gilmour wa

worth th
p nditur
f
that The Ex cutioner s ong
repre ent i on que ti n , h th r Mail r b , ritin
the book ha made Gilmour , orth it i a quit differ nt
one. My own an w r to the fir t que tion i an un qui ocal 'no," since there i nothing o unu ual or di tin tive about the viciou punk who took the Ii
of Ma
Jensen and Ben Bu hnell to require for th tellin of
hi story a literary arti t of Mailer' quality- if that i
it wa to be told at all, or re-told after the dail n w papers and weekly magazine had gotten through, ith it.

Was Gilmour Worth Mailer's Attention?
The second question is omewhat harder to an wer
because it involves at lea t three different con iderations: the non-fiction novel as literary form; Gilmour
as mythic, symbolic figure· and Gilmour a expres ion
of an American sub-culture that is not very often represented in serious American literature or even popular
literature. The Executioner's Song makes no significant
contribution to the non-fiction novel (and none whatsoever to the novel form: indeed it i on the perverse
side, the Pulitzer Prize committee notwithstanding, even
to regard it as a novel). Nor does it succeed in endowing
its subject with any real measure either of mythic or
symbolic meaning, for the very good reason that Gary
Gilmour simply is not made of the necessary stuff.
Perhaps Mailer, recognizing that fact and understanding
how difficult it would be to bring off a metamorphosis
of Gilmour, decided to leave well enough alone. But
whatever the reason, he did not, as the old Mailer
might well have done, overreach in trying to give us
Gilmour as symbolic existential hero, and it is a much
better book for that.
For The Executioner's Song to represent more of an
accomplishment than that, for writing to have offered
a genuine challenge to Mailer and thus constitute for
the reader something considerably more than just an
expert piece of reportage, it would have to present us
with a way of understanding Gary Gilmour and the
world he comes out of that we could come upon nowhere
else. Either because, as I have observed, a unique Gilmour simply did not exist, or because such a Gilmour
was not acces ible to a Mailer who chose not to imagine
one, the writer turns his attention elsewhere, turns it
to th American West that gave birth to Gilmour.
Now, Mailer nowhere sugge t that the West of Washington and Oregon, where Gilmour grew up, or of Utah,
where the murder were committed and the execution
took place, wa in any way responsible for what Gary
Gilmour became. Following along behind him a he
makes hi way from one seeming! sen eles violent
act to another, we have what amounts to v ry nearly
22

ab · lut
u
ilm ur m t
th grand guign. I a p t
of it
d it lf ut a in t a ba kdrop
tah. Hi t ri all
n id r d that
ma n t ha
a , alth u h I u p t that it
a ; Mail r' a c mpli hm nt and it i a much th ace mpli hm nt f th om tim no li t and r ator of
nonfiction no I a of the journali t i to convince
th r ad r that it was ind d th a .
ide from Larry chiller and Barry Farrell, who
are very much Eat Coat/ w York and Hollywood
types almo t e ry one of th principal in the book
come from and decid dly belong to the West. Where
most of the oth r principal are concerned the West
equals tah and Mormon Utah at that. Practically
without exception ev rybody who comes up against
Gilmour, e pecially in the time between his conviction and execution when the whole nation seems to be
breathles ly awaiting the decision to go ahead with
this first capital punishment in 10 years, is placed
vis-a-vi the Mormon Church in the socio-political
scheme of things. With every lawyer, and there are over
a dozen, who comes into the matter, with every judge,
and indeed with every friend and relation of Gary Gilmour, we are told whether people are Mormons and if
they are, the exact nature of their Mormonism and the
degree to which that religion helps shape their lives.
Mormonism, as Mailer sees it, played an enormously
important role in the lives of both the men murdered
by Gary Gilmour, and quite a bit is made of the fact
that Gilmour's mother, Bessie, came from a humble
family that nevertheless was a pioneer Mormon family.
As for the State of Utah's decision to go for the death
penalty for Gilmour, and having made the decision to
stand by it unswervingly, clearly Mailer sees that as an
essential expression of the Mormon ethos.
Against the nearly solidly Mormon background,
such a figure as Dennis Boaz, a native Californian lawyer with a background in radical politics and consciousness-raising of the 1960s variety, looks almost exotic
as he briefly enters the book to defend Gilmour's "right
to die." So too does the Irish Catholic Farrell, a rather
elegant literary man who figures in Larry Schiller's
orbit. But it is the volatile and not overly scrupulous
quasi-intellectual Schiller who is the most exotic of
these non-Utahan non-Mormons, and it is Schiller who
by hi very exoticism throw into relief the almo t
massive stodginess and monochromatic moralism of
the Mormons he everywhere come up again t. More
than any other figure in The Executioners Song, chiller
who looms up a the mo t i id and important charac-
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Without ever resorting explicitly to the categories or the language of sociology, Mailer has
given us an excellent if rather long and at times even tedious sketch of two sub-cultures.

t t

ilmour define for the

read r , if
eth
omethin like a counter-culture
in thi p rva i el Mormon and therefore tightly
re tnctiv o iety, or if not a counter-culture, then at
any rat a way of taking life rather different than the
pre crib d one. Ind ed, most of those uncles and aunts
and cou in with whom Gilmour comes into contact
following hi relea e from pri on and his moving to
Utah are decidedly more relaxed about booze and
broads and ob cenity than one might expect them to
be. And then there is the girl friend, icole, who takes
her sex whenever it suits her, who has-as she herself
would eem to be-an emotionally disturbed sister and
a father neither of whom is any better than they ought
to be, and who takes up with a man named Barrett who
looks more like a Haight-Ashbury or Village type common to the Sixties than like any of the stem-faced
Mormon lawyers or judges we are repeatedly shown.

Booze, Drugs, and Lower-Class Mormons
Seen in the context of Nicole, Barrett, et al., with
their casual sex and booze and drugs, Gilmour does
not look all that unusual. In fact he seems, following
his release from the penetentiary, to slip with surprising
ease into this new milieu that is so carefully described
for us by Mailer. At least to the casual eye, he could be
any Mormon backslider or lower-class Mormon who
simply does not take his religion as seriously as he
should. If he is a rebel, he is a rebel without any cause
except the right to smash car windows and people's
faces when he is annoyed or irritated, which is any time
that he does not immediately get his way.
We get in The Executioner's Song about as much of
Gary Gilmour as we want or need, and about as much
as I suspect was there to be gotten out of him. And the
best and most interesting of what we get is Gilmour
as a social animal involved with a great many other
social animals, most of them of the Utahan species.
Gilmour as a verbal animal excreting letters and poems
is there too, but more as a check on the social Gilmour
than anything else. We get these things, which are considerable, without the virtuoso Norman Mailer we
remember from The Arm.ies of the Night and so many
other books written in the Sixties. That we do so is a
tribute to an artist who part-journalist, part-publicist,
and decidedly aware of how novels get written, know
how to select and arrange even the most intractable
materials; how to cro -cut from character to character
and place to place, how to develop a dramatic cene out
of hints and ugge tion · and how to extract the maxieptember 1982

mum possible meaning and expressiveness from human
speech: The Executioner's Song is above all a book of
dialogue, direct and indirect, in which the voices of
Gary Gilmour and Larry Schiller-and an author who
knows exactly how, through voice-over and a kind of
lyrical commentary, to say an enormous amount without
insisting on his presence as a voice-carry much of the
meaning of the book. With a minimum of fuss and without ever resorting explicitly to the categories or the
language of sociology, Norman Mailer has given us in
his big book an excellent if rather long and at times
even tedious sketch of two sub-cultures, Utah Mormon
and Utah "low life," ancJ of a Gary Gilmour who is
very much a part of it at the same time that he keeps a
certain distance from it.
Writing about Gilmour, who after all he never met
and who existed for him primarily through the medium
of the written word or the word spoken after the fact
and the event by Gilmour and by others engaged in
the process of imposing a form on Gilmour's life and
bloody deeds, Mailer comes through as a reasonably
balanced and critical observer of men and of society.
With Abbott, though, he did not have the kind of buffer that existed between him and Gilmour, which perhaps explains at least in part why he should have been
taken in by that hardened unrepentant criminal. (In
an interview with television's Ed Bradley, Abbott made
it quite clear that he was neither repentant nor remorseful for Adan's murder. It was, after all, only a mistake
that arose because of his justifiable suspicion of anyone
living on New York's lower East Side.) Would he have
been taken in, however, if he had not been prepared
to be by the development of that long and di honorable
tradition so well de cribed by Lane Morrow of romanticizing, sentimentalizing, and finally glorifying criminality? Of course Mailer had him elf played a large
role in perpetrating that tradition, which i to ay that
he helped make it po ible for him elf to b tak n in.
Or put omewhat differently one ould almo t ay that
in Mailer we have a ca e of life blindly f llowing art
as it uncritically follows life trying to di emble by
means of art. But it wa only when I turn d ba k to th
artful account of Gary Gilmour' lif and re- xamin d
it in the glaring light pro ided by Ja k bbott' that
I under tood how orman Mailer had tumbl d up n a
celebration not of lif or of creativit but of death in th
form of tho e who kill. The final irony i that whil
both the killer Gilmour and bb tt, and th man who
provided the link b tw n then and nd w d b th with
a certain fame orman Mail r w r all writ r , o too
was th man that bb tt kill d. In fa t hi r at1 1t
ran in two dir ction : b id writin play , h a t d
in them and had ju t b n i n an imp rtant part in
one wh n bb tt tru k him down.
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The movies have recently adopted romance, but
they haven't always observed the proper conventions.

The Perils of the
Cinematic Romance
Richard Maxwell
Over the last few years the movies
have adopted romance. George Lucas started the trend with Star Wars.
Since that time we have had-to
mention just a few samples-The
Empire Strikes Back, Flash Gordon,
Dragons lay er, Raiders of the Lost Ark,
Conan the Barban·an, and the two Star
Treks. Occasionally these films pretend to be science fiction. The pretense is thin, for they exploit all the
appurtenances of romance: the hero,
the quest, the magic weapon, the
enchanted landscape, the monsters.
The most telltale sign of all is that
so many (following Lucas) promise
sequels. This commitment to telling
another story, or telling the same
story again, has made the success
and revealed the weakness of the
new cinematic romance.
When we have read a romanceit is said-our impulse is not to
think on it but to read another romance. Enchantment, in these terms,
is a form of addiction. We keep
going with Ariosto-or Star Wars, or
Star Trek, or Conan the Barban·anprecisely because there is the prom-

Richard Maxwell is currently on sabbatical leave from his teaching duties in
Christ College and in the English Department at Valparaiso University. He
is the regular Film critic for The
Cresset.
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i e of another pi ode, in fa t of infinitel y man epi od
tretching
out into the di tanc . It i not f r
nothing that Luca promi ed nin
Star Wars in tead of on . On
Wars is a mere bagatell .
Wars promi e endle
pleasure. Thi i a tory we could
live with.
I have a friend who read Ario to
great romance Orlando Fun·oso. H e
wrote down a plot summary after
each episode, for which I mocked
him. "It is important," he aid, "to
know who has the hippogriff this
week." There is justice in this remark, but a limited justice. If we
need to know who is using the hippogriff, Ariosto usually tells usjust as in Conan comic books there
are footnotes at appropriate intervals, referring us back to issue #118
of three years ago, when a particular
character or monster was previous! y
introduced. Romance builds up its
imaginative world by interlacings
so complex that we wander confusedly, as in the forest or the labyrinth. Disorientation adds to the
zest. Never are we left in complete
ignorance.
Like other romances, the cinematic kind thrives on recurrence,
episode, and sequel. We are provided with a sense of infinite possibilities: a hero faces a world where
he can have adventures indefinitely.
Romance can accommodate obsessiveness or single-mindedness.
There must, however, be many intermixing obsessions, so that no one
of them constrains us. This spaciousness- this freedom-provides our
pleasure. It is precisely the spaciousness and the freedom that tend to get
lost in movies.
On the face of it this is surprising.
Did not The Empire Stn·kes Back or
Raiders of the Lost Ark careen from
world to world? The answer is yes,
but the careening-particularly in
Raiders-remained willfull. As several critics observed, you cannot put
twelve serial episodes back to back

tt n
nin th mind. Jamm d toeth r , peri n ed all at on , they
indu h teria.
One way or anoth r th paciousn e of roman c collap e .
he
mo ie romanc can off r u gr eat
c ne : Dragonsla er's title-beast
lurking in hi cavern, single-combat
on a lurching platter poised above
an aby (Flash Gordon) , war on the
ice planet in The Empire Stn'kes Back.
It is the way that these scenes and
situations mingle that calls romance
into question. Two recent attempts
illustrate the danger involved.
Conan the Barbarian is based on the
Marvel comicbook hero (now in his
138th monthly episode). These stories are nothing if not repetitive, yet
given the narrow premises-hulking, hearty barbarian fights sorcerers and monsters, also beds women- there is considerable variety.
As in much popular art, the discipline of formula prompts artists and
writers to seek an originality within
convention. The comicbook Conan
has its little surprises, its small pleasures, along with the ever-present
promise of sex and violence.
The film Conan takes over the sex
and violence. It misses the surprises.
The audience for this movie cannot
be assumed to know the rules of the
game. Everything must be explained
to it, from Conan's childhood onwards. Director John Milius wastes
half an hour establishing just how
it was that a Nietzschean superman
grew up in the great H yperborean
wildernesses. Even then details remain obscure. Romances never begin at the beginning. Milius doesn't
know that.
Romances don't go on to the end
either. Here again Milius fails. He
has made his Conan a revenge story,
but revengers lose their interest for
us once they have gotten even. Conan's parents were slaughtered by
The Cresset

Conan says little, aside from grunting with pleasure
when women, food, or battle are thrust upon him.
Jame Earl Jon
an unplea ant
fate.\ h n Jon i om red at la t,
he hi e to th grim barbarian:
' When you hav kill d me, you will
have nothing el e to liv for." Right.
So much for Conan JI, which i in
fact promi ed u .
One detail in Conan acknowledges
a larger story, of which this film is a
fragment. Practically from the first
frame, a curiously-accented voiceover explains Conan 's life. Conan
himself says little, aside from grunting with pleasure when women,
food, or battle are thrust upon him.
That other voice carries the filmat least it tries to-yet Milius fails
to establish who is speaking. Only
towards the end do we learn the
speaker's identity. He turns out to
be a kind of henchman- an incompetent magician, whom we are to
conceive as accompanying Conan
on subsequent adventures. The
voice of the magician promises Conan's persistence, promises his
eventual fame, promises (in fact)
Conan II, III, IV, and so on to the end
of time.
Conan's entanglement in a larger
cycle of adventures is acknowledged
glancingly, almost with embarrassment. In the case of Star Trek, similar issues have to be faced head-on.
Everybody in America must have
seen old Star Trek reruns at one time
or another. There is no point pretending that the Star Trek movies
issued su£ generis from Hollywood.
They are imitations: spectacular,
epic-scale ventures which want nothing more than to recapture the spirit
of an ancient TV show.
The first time around, forty million dollars couldn't buy that spirit.
The principals sat around, stunned
at each other's existence. Nothing
happened-except a stately, trancelike tour through outer space, culminating in the vaporization of two
redundant characters. Star Trek I
was not so much a sequel as a family
reunion: a tribute to the fact of recurrence. Everybody should have
September, 1982
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stayed home and mowed the lawn.
Star Trek II was a big step up. With
the possible exception of Mr. Spock,
the actors looked happy to be back .
A well-crafted script brought in several important parts of the Star Trek
past. This really was a story in progress, featuring (a) the loathsome
Khan, Captain Ahab of the galaxies,
pursuing our hero, Captain Kirk; (b)
Captain Kirk's son, just arriving at
adulthood and discovering for the
first time his father's identity and
character. Khan (Ricardo Montalban, surprisingly fierce) had appeared in one of the TV episodes
back in the Sixties. Kirk's sex life
was something we always wondered
about. This movie took pleasure in
filling gaps: revealing old secrets,
bringing us up to date. It was a gossipy little film. It finished nothing
but Khan.
There was, in addition, the matter
of the doomsday machine. The plot
of Star Trek II revolves around an
ingenious device which creates new
life by rearranging all available
molecules. If you are around when
the machine arrives, you get rearranged. Presumably you turn into
a tree, or perhaps a waterfall. Khan
steals the doomsday machine (which
is also a genesis machine) with an
eye to pointing it at vulnerable civilizations. He points it at Kirk instead. To rescue the good ship Enterprise, Mr. Spock must sacrifice himself. He ends up lying in state on a
newly rearranged planet.
Spock is dead. Until Star Trek III.
As a wise English major remarked to
me, "They have to bring him back.
They've signed him to the next one."
This may appear to be a remark
about finance. It is, I maintain , a
remark about romance. All heroes
of romance are signed to the next
one, whether they realize it or not.
There are aesthetic reasons to make
sequels, as well as business reasons.
How pleasant if our filmmaker
could more often admit this fact.
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In a Family Way
Ghosts, Shore Acres,
And True West
John Steven Paul

In preparing questions for the
final examination in my modern
American drama course this spring,
I was reminded again of the frequency with which the playwrights
represented on the syllabus had
looked to the family for the subjects and the contexts of their plays.
There are, of course, the war plays,
the social and political dramas,
and the plays set in hospitals, subways, and storefronts as well. But
probably the majority of American
dramas unfold in the backyard, the
bedroom , or around the dining
room table.
Three recent productions on
stages around the country have provided opportunities to consider the
family dynamic as a vivifying
medium for modern drama. Two are
old plays, Henrik Ibsen's Ghosts,
produced at the Loeb Drama C nter
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and
James A. Herne' Shore Acres at the
University of Wi consin-Madi on;
one is new, am hepard' True West,
produced by the
t ppen wolf
Theatre in Chicago.
The American Repertory Theatre
has revived lb n's Ghosts one
hundred year after it premi r p r-

John t ven Paul is Assistant Professor of peech and Drama at Valparaiso niversity and regular Theatre
critic for The r et.
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Bricks in the wall is an apt metaphor for the familiar family strategies intended
to block out, blunt, or obfuscate the painful truths that haunt their houses.
formance. In thi mod rn traged ,
lb en focu es on a woman attempting
to manage the truth . Th central
character i Captain 1 ing' widow
H elene, who e monument to her
hu band's memory an orphanage
is nearing completion. Home for
the dedicatory ceremony is their
son Oswald, a painter unable to
concentrate due to evere head pain
and mental angui h . In the first
act Mr . Al ving reveals to her minister, Manders, the true history of
the Alving family. This truth is
born laboriously of a woman who
has spent years suppressing it,
emerging only after the resolution
of a raging internal conflict.
Still, Helene Alving is the mistress of her truth a she is the mistress of her house and it is with the
utmost composure that she divulges
the sordid facts to the precisianist
pastor. Captain Alving was an incorrigible philanderer and dipsomaniac throughout their married
life. While she had stayed with her
husband out of an obsessive sense
of duty, she felt compelled to send
her son away for the sake of his
moral development. The final indignity was Alving's liaison with
the housemaid which resulted in a
child, a girl who now serves as Mrs.
Alving's maid. Outraged but trapped
by social and self-imposed strictures, Mrs. Alving remained with
her husband until his death, but
took care to be financially independent and to keep their funds
completely separate. After his death
she had planned to spend Alving's
money by erecting and endowing
the orphanage, thereby assuring
that Oswald would come by no legacy from his father.
Helene Alving yearns for the
completion of the building and for
Mander ' a sumption of it operation. he believes that having accepted the truth and interred it in
the walls of a charitable edifice
she will be fre to live apart from
it. But the truth, it eems, will not
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th

flirtation with th
m
h u maid Re ina whi p r to
fr .
1 in another truth : in h r tri ing to appea e h er own od of dut
and rectitude he had uffo at d
her hu band'
forced him to
hi joy and con olation. Wh n O wald propo e a union b h
him elf and the girl who i unb known t to him hi half- i ter
Mrs. Alving bring her elf to inform them of their relation hip and
to bless their intentions in the
name of life and in spite of con entional morality. But Regina is di gusted by this truth and quits the
hou e.
Alone with her beloved son,
Helene Al ving will not be buffeted
by truths over which she has no control. Oswald confronts his mother
with the source of his debilitating
headaches. They stem from an incurable degenerative disease-syphilis. It is a legacy from father to
son of which Mrs. Alving was unable
to dispose. In a moment of supreme
dramatic irony, Oswald concedes
that because of his disease, he will
soon be a helpless vegetable.
Robert Brustein's production emphasized the tension between the
material and the immaterial forces
struggling for dominance in the
life of the family. The Alving house,
ponderously constructed of brownblack oak and furnished in sedate
Victoriana, seems designed to harbor unspoken truths. As solid as the
construction appeared, we were
urprised by candle light dimly
illuminating rooms behind walls
and by heavy doors flung open uncannily as if by spirits demanding
to be heard. This struggle took
place against a stunning backdrop
of floor-to-ceiling window glass
dripping with rain. Through the
window , the palisade of the fjord
faded in and out of the mi ts. ow

mu i al pa a t . It wa

either, I now realiz a I it with
th 1yric in front of m : Daddy what
else did ou leave for me/ Dadd what
d ' a leave behind for me/ All in all
it was just a brick in the wall. ix weeks
later, tho e word , unfortunately unintelligible in the theatre are ghosts
them elves of a stirring production
of lb en' antiquated masterpiece.
Bricks in the wall is an apt metaphor for the familiar family strategies intended to block out, blunt,
or obfu cate the painful truths that
haunt their houses. The photograph
of the posed group of smilers gathered round the festive table belies
the bitterness hovering outside the
photo album. Living room chat is
often less meaningful than bedroom
silence. The natural inclination to
dwell upon the happiness near the
surface and the ritualized pleasantries of everyday life push back the
day when the truth must be faced.
Movement toward such moments of
truth has been the stuff of drama
since Homer's time.
James A. Herne constructed his
play Shore Acres around another moment of truth. This 1892 drama has
been produced by a group of faculty
and graduate students at the University of Wisconsin in Madison.
Although Herne made seminal contributions to the modern American
drama, his plays lie largely forgotten in the shadows of the nineteenth century. The value of the
research at Wiscon in, under the
direction of Professor Esther M.
The Cresset

Shepard s True West, like Heme's Shore Acres, is a drama of two brothers
which winds its way mysteriously, comically, anxiously toward the truth.
Ja k n i that it ha br u ht thi
pla (and th r n l t d landmark f th
of th libra
e p rim ntal
ta
H rn '
drama come
aliv and a p t of character and
langua which in a r ading remain
ubordinat to a
ntim ntal plot
emerge a
entrall
meaningful.
In hore Acres, H me tell the
story of th Berry , a farm family
living on the Maine coa t, consi ting of Martin and Anne and everal
children, the olde t of whom is
Helen. Living with them i Martin's
older brother athaniel, who helps
on the farm and tends the lighthouse
located on the property. On its surface, the double plot of Shore Acres
seems old-fashioned and sentimental.
Martin Berry rejects daughter
Helen's choice of a husband because
the young man holds to new-fangled
ideas and because the father has his
own candidate for his daughter's
hand, an older businessman. This
same businessman has encouraged
Martin Berry to mortgage the family
farm and to use the money to divide
the land into sites for holiday cottages. Two catastrophes ensue: the
daughter runs away from home with
her intended and the bottom drops
out of the real estate market, leaving
the farm mortgaged and untillable.
On Christmas Eve, the family is
desolate with daughter gone and
farm to be forfeit. But on the fateful night, Helen and her husband
return with new babe in arms, and
Nathaniel's back pension from Civil
War service arrives in time to redeem the farm.
At the core of this gentle, domestic
drama about the threatened estrangement of daughter and father
and loss of the family farm is a conflict between two brothers. Martin
Berry i narrow-minded and ambitious, dissatisfied with his morethan-sati factory lot in life, and
morally haky. Nathaniel i tolerant
and self-effacing quietly appreciaSeptember, 1982

tiv of the good things in his life,
and deeply committed to his values.
the owner of the farm and the
paterfamilias, Martin is apparently
uperior to athaniel.
The initial point of conflict between the brothers is the future of
the farm. To Martin, the land repreents an exploitable resource potentially profitable beyond its present
value; to athaniel the land is the
foundation of the family's existence,
the vessel of its tradition, wellbeing, happiness, and values. The
older brother reluctantly agrees to
the younger one's plan to mortgage
and divide the farm, but the divergence in their modes of thought
and action has been dramatically
exposed.
The brothers' conflict extends
beyond the question of the farmland.
When Martin's daughter and her
fiance defy his wishes and set off
away from him by ship, Martin is
infuriated. He runs to the lighthouse, where Nathaniel is manning
the light, and demands to know
whether his brother had prior knowledge of Helen's plan. When
Nathaniel admits tacit complicity,
Martin denounces him and earnestly
calls for the ship's wreck on the
rocks. Martin's desire for Helen'
demise stuns Nathaniel, and the
brothers stand face to face , frozen
in their moment of truth. Long
unspoken, that truth now irrupt
in Nathaniel's desperate speech to
his brother. As a young man
Nathaniel had loved Anne, now
Martin's wife. When he aw that hi
younger brother al o loved her he
stepped aside and looked on with
avuncular resignation while the two
raised a large family. Re erving for
himself a quasi-paternal int re t
in Martin's children ,
athaniel
condemns him for wi hing H len
peril. The truth of
athani l'
deep r commitment to the girl
welfare hame Martin.
ow th
beacon flicker and threaten to o
out. athaniel climb th
tair t

tend it. The enraged father wishes
his daughter dead and tries to restrain the uncle from restoring the
light. But the older man bests the
younger, lights the light, and in o
doing disgraces his younger brother.
The rhythm of Shore Acres is comic: the happiness of a family i di rupted but through the action of
one of the characters and some good
fortune that happiness is restored.
Yet, as this excellent production
demonstrated (more clearly than
would. only a reading of the text),
the shadow of Martin Berry's humiliation hovers over the happy
final scene, giving the play a faintly
tragic cast. The a surance of the
family's well-being come after an
explosion of truth demoli he the
wall of tactful silence that had
stood for many year , after an pisode of physical violence, and after
the mortification of the fath r of
the family.
lb en and Herne have bound their
moments of truth with mom nt of
violence. Mr . Alving's int rnal
conflict rages as furiously a do
the battle in Berry Lighthou e. Lik
a river torrent rushing through a
ruptured dike, th truth ru hing
freely through tructure meant to
contain it i viol ntly d tru tiv .
Violence, pa t or pr nt a tual
or thr atened, n tag or r port d
i c ntral to th drama f am
hepard . Hi Pulitz r Priz winn r
Buried Child (1979) d al with ince t, in fan ti id
gnawing guilt
and uppr · d truth in th lif
f
an Illinoi farm family. True West
like hore Acres, i · a drama f tw
broth r whi h wind it wa my ,_
all ,
an i u 1

liv
iti '
rt and mak hi

al n
li ing
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In the play's final tableau, the brothers are poised for fight, regarding
each other warily. This is their moment of truth in Shepard s true West.
as a thief. Austin, refined, rational,
and well-mannered, and Lee , coarse,
volatile, and brutish, are together
for the first time in several years
at their mother's house in southern
California. Mom is touring Alaska.
Austin is working on a movie deal
and minding Mom's plants. Lee is
working the neighborhood.
In his physique and explosive
demeanor, Lee retains malevolent
though implicit power over his
brother. For a time, Austin maintains his poise and a reasonable
distance from his brother. There
are sensitive issues between the two:
Lee is envious of Austin's highquality education and his artistic
profession. Austin is contemptuous
of Lee's lifestyle and criminality.
They are both short-fused regarding
their father, a dissolute, impoverished hermit who lives a lonely life
in the Arizona desert.
While Lee is off "at work," Saul
Kimmer, a foppishly fashionable
Hollywood producer, comes to the
house to close the deal on Austin's
screenplay. Lee barges in on them,
carrying a hot television, and unabashedly suggests that he and
Kimmer play a round of golf during
which they might discuss a story of
his own that might be developed
for the movies - a Westem.
The relative truthfulness and commercial appeal of the brothers'
stories now become points of conflict.
Austin has written an historical romance, a period piece rich in
authentic detail. Lee's story is conventional melodrama, sensationalized, contrived tripe. Incredibly,
Lee not only beats Kimmer on the
golf course, but sells him his story.
In fact, Kimmer decides to drop
Austin's project and engage him as
a screenwriter for Lee's story.
Austin, distraught over Kimmer's
change of plans, refuses to work on
Lee's story and drinks himself into
a maudlin inebriety. As Lee, now a
salaried screenwriter, punches at
a typewriter with burgeoning

28

fru tration
u tin p r i
phonine of th ntir Holl
scene. He blurt out-in vino ven·tas-another tory of th tim h
went to vi it their fath r in rizona, their father who wa o drunk
that he left hi dentures in a do gie
bag of chopsueylyingin a bar. Wh n
he sobered up, the old man for ot
which bar he'd left them in. That
Austin declares, is a true-to-life
story.
In an absurdly comic elaboration
on Aristotle's principle of plot
reversal, Austin takes up his
brother's challenge to him that he
doesn't have the stomach to steal a
toaster. In the next scene the lights
come up on Lee smashing the typewriter with a golf club and Austin
smiling at a kitchen counter full of
stolen toasters. The house is a total
wreck; the plants have died for lack
of care. In the middle of Lee's
frenzy, Austin is stricken with an
urge to go with him back to the
desert. Lee agrees to take his
brother-in return for a completed
screenplay. Now Austin feverishly
transcribes as Lee frantically dictates his story.
Unannounced, Mom returns early
from Alaska; she is rather mildly
disturbed about the condition of
her house. At her entrance, Lee
changes his mind and decides to
leave for the desert alone. His decision infuriates Austin, who sneaks
up on Lee while he is relieving his

on ciou n . But, when
r la
th t n ion a bit, Lee
leap to hi f et like a leopard. In
the play' final tabl au, th broth rs
are poised for fight regarding each
other warily. Thi is their moment
of truth in the true West.
Interpreting am Shepard's vision
of the truth is difficult even in this
riveting production by the Steppenwolf Company. What is not true is
Hollywood's tissue of lies that gives
the appearance of truth. This the
brothers discover together as they
shuffle their roles of filmwriter and
felon. What may be true is that,
despite their masks of conscious
identity, brother, brother, and
father are reflections and echoes of
one another and are destined to
wind up in the same desert. What is
true, for Shepard in True West, is
that, stripped of the illusions, defenses, pretenses, buffers, and
strategic silences that lubricate
human contact, two brothers are
more likely to kill one another than
two strangers. And that truth speaks
to the phenomenon of family violence and to the durability of the
family play.
Cl

The Hunchback in the Field
is an apple tree felled
four feet from the root.
Wild honeysuckle clings
to the wood; grey onion
weeds form wavering arms.
Birds arc a betrothal dance
above it. Who could be afraid?
Me.

Sister Maura
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Review Essay
Jill Baumgaertner

The White Hotel
By D. M. Thomas. New York: Pocket
Books. 322 pp. $3.50 (paper).

Dinner at the
Homesick Restaurant
By Anne Tyler. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf. 303 pp. $13.50.

The White Hotel by D. M . Thomas
accelerates to a frenetic tempo, gaining speed and momentum like the
trains which permeate its imagery,
until it finally crashes through the
characters' and the readers' preconceptions. The novel begins with an
exchange of letters between Freud
and his colleagues. One of the su bjects that is repeated , amidst wh at
appears to be unrelated material, is
the rem arkable writing of one of
Freud's p atients, wh o is allegedly
sufferin g from hysteria. Freu d defines her mental state as "an extreme

Jill Bau mgaertner regularly reviews
fiction for The Cresset in addition to
serving as its Poetry Editor. She holds
degrees from Drake and Emory and
currently teaches English at Wheaton
College.
September, 1982

The White Hotel and Dinner at the Homesick
Restaurant rely on poetry in very different ways.
of libidinous phantasy combined
with an extreme of morbidity. It is
a if Venus looked in her mirror and
saw the face of Medusa."
Her writings follow in the next
two chapters. The first of these is a
long poem; the second, a prose expan ion of the poem. In both the
young woman imagines herself with
a stranger in a white hotel. Most of
the hotel visitors die in fires, drowning , cable car falls; but while disaster follows disaster, the woman and
her lover have become each other's
world. The physical, present, sexual
moment becomes the way to avoid
calamity.
The link between death and sex is
amplified in the next section of the
novel, Freud's case history of "Frau
Anna," really Lisa Erdman, the
author of the fantasy pieces. Freud
identifies one of the major sources
of Frau Anna's problems as the
death by hotel fire of two lovers,
Anna's mother and uncle. Frau
Anna's repression of the memory
and subsequent hysteria created,
Freud insists, her incapacitating
physical ailments: severe pain in
her left breast and ovary.
As The White Hotel progresses
from poem to prose-fantasy to case
history, and as the style becomes
more objective and less imaginative,
an illusion is encouraged-that
scientific treatment and analysis
uncovers truth, that poetry is really
insanity, that dreams and fantasies
either exaggerate or mask objective
reality.
The next chapter is straight narration told from the third person
limited point of view, the story of
seven years in the life of Li a ("Frau
Anna") Erdman. Here the reader
first begins to suspect Freud' reasonably stated conclusions. Li a returns to her childhood home and
discovers that her memorie of the
place were flawed.
They lay then. drying their leg in the u nshine : which was warm . but not nearl y o
hot as she recalled , perhap becau of the

lateness of the season. or were the plants.
trees and flowers in the ample grounds subtropical. as her memory said they were.
She was surprised by that failure . Perhaps
her memory had confused their own garden
with some of the other places they had
visited in their yacht. further to the south .

Every incident in this chapter leads
to questions. Can the memory be
trusted? Could the human mind
distort reality in order to rationalize
its own sickness? Or does the psychoanalyst supply the patient with a
vocabulary which describes the doctor's own mental state and not the
patient's?
The next-to-last chapter, told from
the third person omniscient point
of view, is one of the most brutal
chapters in modern literature. Lisa
and her stepson Kolya are herded
with the rest of the Jewish population into a small area where they are
prepared to be shot and thrown into
a common grave. Before the gunfire
hits them, she and Kolya jump into
the pile of bodies. Lisa is discovered
alive by a guard who kicks her in the
left breast and pelvis before he rapes
her with hi gun. Here is the source
of the psychosomatic pain Freud had
attempted to explain. And her i
sex and death-a blatant, non-philosophical, non-psychological fact
with no metaphoric content at all.
Li a's early illne wa pr ci nee.
She wa born with the agony of
death inside her. And it r ated
po try. nd the p try, th m taphor, was the truth.
The final chapt r i puzzling. Entitled "Th Camp" it r v al Li a
and Kolya emigratin to th Promised Land. he i r unit d with d ad
fri nd and finally, with h r mother.
Th implication that thi i an afterlif wh r Li a' lif lon wound ar
finally heal d i an un omfortabl
entim ntal ndin to an th rwi
effecti
othin in th n v 1
pr par th r ad r for thi hapt r
which
m to b a wi hful f

p ri n

ambi 2

uou m The White Hotel. i a Erdman
half-J wi h, half- ath li .
h con tantl fin r h r ru ifi ,
et die a a Je\,1 • Her m mo
ambiguou . H r xp ri n
a a
human being i ambiguou . Th
only thing that i. not ambi ou i
her poetr , which i mi int rpreted.
Her poem al o pro id a en ational and titillating fir t chapter to
a now be t- elling novel. I thi a
crafty u e of ex and iolence to capture a ummer crowd or i it a cla ic
piece of literature? I hav to conclude that it is both.
D. M. Thoma ha trapped u in
The White Hotel's expanding consciousne s and, finally, we see that
the only true literature is poetry
and the only true interpreter is the
poet whose memory we cannot fully
trust. In The White Hotel we first
see the poetic reflections of a sensitive mind talking to itself. Then, a
prose version, which makes more
narrative sense, yet distances the
reader from the purity of poetic
image. Then Freud provides his
own analytic insight in his case history, a record of his relationship
with the patient. At this point the
novel has expanded to include two
consciousnesses. The point of view
then broadens to show Lisa several
years later. Here we stand outside
Lisa, even though we are privy to
her thoughts. We see her actions first
hand. No one tells us about them.
Here, too, we feel a part of a narrative with beginning, middle, and
end. Finally, we see the last day in
the lives of Lisa and Kolya, told
from the point of view of an omniscient narrator.
Thomas leads us from the perspective of a mind talking to itself,
to a narrator's mind which tand
outside of the action and know all
thoughts and actions of all characters, to, in the final chapter, a mind
which sees beyond life. In the end
we are left with the fe ling that perhap that unseen presence, the consciou nes through which the final
half of the book i ifted that anonymous and invisible third per on, i
a god or a devil who looks silently
and noncommittally on. It i m one
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, th uth r him 1 , th
Th Jtf hit Hot l. hi

hil-

tim
hildr n

to

or-

rectl .
nne Tyler Dinner at the Homesick Restaurant r lie on po t
m
quite a different a . Thi i th
tory of thre children and a meanspirited, volatile mother. ith uch
a maternal influence th children
learn self-reliance at an early age.
But even with a mother of udden,
violent outbreaks and ob e 1ve organization, sibling rivalry 1mmer
among the three children.
Cody, the eldest, rigs up elaborate
schemes to di credit his brother
Ezra-like removing the bed lats
from Ezra's bed, balancing the mattress on the frame, and scattering
girlie magazines around the room.
All of this for the crashing effect of
a door flung wide and a mother's
irritated, then rabid reaction to her
younger and favored son's apparent
decadence. Dinner at the Homesick
Restaurant is not farce, however. A
streak of poignant desperation runs

a h of the
adult
horn i k for clutter,
familial warmth. C d buy an old
hou in th country and n i ion
a wif , children, and a gard n. He
teal frumpy little Ruth from Ezra,
marrie her, and p nd the re t of
hi life a far from Baltimore and
Ezra as he can manage it. But he
never ells his hou e. Hi family
dream. Jenny and Ezra make recovering from their childhood their
lives' work. Jenny become an appealingly disorganized and unkempt
pediatrician-mother. Ezra revamps
the elegant Scarlatti's into a homier
establishment. His dreams are wild1y appealing.
Why not a restaurant full of refrigerators .
where people came and chose the food they
wanted? They could fix it themselves on a
long, long stove lining one wall of the dining room . Or maybe he could install a giant
fireplace, with a whole steer turning slowly
on a spit. You'd slice what you liked onto
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The Iowa State Fair
One a y ar blue ribbon Angus,
qu aling porkettes and barbecue kings,
doodle ack , chameleons, 25-lb. gourds,
loquaciou clowns wanting a bath.

h
tr ngth of Dinner at the
Homesick Restaurant lie in yl r'
dream flight and fancy and her
occa ional po tic outbur t . On her
deathb d, for exampl Pearl Tull
drift into poetry.
he remembered the feel of wind on ummer night -how it billows through the
hou e and waft the curtains and smells of
tar and ro e . How a sleeping baby weighs
so heavily on your shoulder, like ripe fruit.
What privacy it is to walk in the rain beneath the drip and crackle of your own umbrella. he remembered a country auction
she'd attended forty years ago, where they'd
offered up an antique brass bed complete
with all its bedclothes-sheets and blankets. pillow in a linen case embroidered with
forget-me-nots. Two men wheeled it onto
the platform , and its ruffled coverlet stirred
like a young girl's petticoats.

The pity of this novel is that these
lyrical moments are so brief. The
book keeps insisting, through its
poetry, that it will develop into
something extraordinary. That
never happens. Tyler becomes more
interested in writing a family chronicle than a sustained piece of poetry,
and the characters suffer because the
poetry and the characterization seem
to be on completely different tracks.
For example, Cody, a thin, stereotypical character, ends the book with
an uncommon flash of poetic insight.
The final words are lovely, but they
don't fit Cody at all. It's a bit disorienting.
One critic has said that Anne
Tyler's work is "as though Flannery
O'Connor were to forget all about
religion and write a whole novel as
droll as her tales." Flannery O'Connor's fiction devoid of it religious
content is impossible to imagine.
That kind of unity is what i missing
in Anne Tyler's work. Her poetry
can be eparated only too ea ily from
her plot. Her poetry i however,
worth eparating from her plot. Cl
September. 1982

elf-propelled combines in a minuet,
gyrating pinwheels, honky-tonk arcades,
baby fish kisses magic lantern shows,
an American flag made out of firecrackers.
queeze your girl on the Wild Mouse
and the ferris wheel, make faces
at each other in a transparent house of glass
-dumfounded whisper before the 3-headed ca~f.
Horseshoe codgers, honeydew melons, country western hoe-down,
ring the bell, win a cigar,
shoot the owl, take home a stuffed bear,
sign my petition, usher in ... pandemonium.
Lepidopterous display, feisty brouhaha,
numero uno, egg foo yong,
baby oil, Kiwanis and FFA,
-where's my Shinto waterfall?
Turnip faces, bump-and-go teenyboppers,
I-23, G-54, helicopter rides,
evangelist preaching on the holy Christ rood,
-let's go see the swimming competition.
Parents scolding four-year-old screams,
sideshow derelicts the cops would like to pinch,
world's largest mushroom, a paint-by-number quilt,
the pavilion dedicated to modern industrial waste.
Highway patrol smashes up some cars, teache you how to drive,
a dwarf on stilts, moo-cow going splat,
campaign button: "Do It Again Ike,"
nostalgia's big down on the farm.
Say five masses for Sister Mary Margaret, the midwe t' fir t woman clown,
methane extracted from pig manure, alcohol from ugar cane,
Bozo and Greenjeans entertain th tot ,
Clark Gable and Bette Davis turn on mom and pop.
Guess your weight? soybean quarter-pound r
45th anniversary of Lawrenc and Mr . Welk
magnetic ant hills, di app aring wat r
Miss America 1952 perform h r farew 11 routin
Return of King Kong Bett Bo p hit parade12-hour crui eon "The G od hip Lollip p
de tination memory lane kit ch kal ido cop
e capi t Erewhon.

n alga ic milk,

Ken Bazyn

31

Campus
Diary

..........
______..
CJCJC]CJCJC]CJ
CJCJCJC]CJC]CJ
Reflections of an
Old Liberal- I
John Strietelmeier
"Perhaps," say
Ian Brinkley
in his June Harper's review of Theodore H. White's America in Search of
Itself: The Making of the President
1956-1980, "Perhaps, for liberals of
the World War II generation, it was
inevitable that it should end this
way: in sour recriminations against
a society that seems to have rejected their values."
I have spent a lot of time this
summer contemplating these words.
I will have been a card-carrying
liberal for half a century this coming
November when those of us old
enough to remember FDR's first
election will, if ambulatory, gather
in the rec rooms of our nursing
homes to bless the day when he burst
upon the scene and gave our country
a new birth of hope. And I am a
member of the World War II generation, albeit recently enrolled as a
probationary member of the Golden
Years Club. So when I read that for
liberals of the World War II generation "it" (whatever "it" might
be) had to end a certain way, I
pricked up my ears and listened.
When someone of my age reads
that "it" has to end, he anticipates
a pitch either for a specially-designed, no-physical-required old
folks' life insurance policy or a
luxurious new perpetual-care mausoleum featuring piped-in Muzak.
It was with a sense of relief therefore that I learned in reading on
that the "it" that had ended wa not
life it elf but something called the
'Old Country" - Ted Whites term
for the America of th 1950 the
Am rica of the moderate to liberal
32

a c ndan . I am n t quit
die. I an handl - althou h I w uld
pref r not to ha
to - th d lin
of the
orld
ar II
ofliberal .
Of thi g n ration Brinkl
a
' eldom ha a g n ration com
age o imbued " ith optimi m o
certain of their nation ri ht ou ne , o confident of their own
moral claim to 1 ad r hip of their
ociety and the world.
nd he a ,
Ted White himself i aware of the
hubris of the era which thi generation dominated. In fact, he can account for it. It began, says Brinkley
quoting White, in "the Year of
Victory, 1945."
"The intoxication of that victory
has lasted for a generation," according to White, and it is presumably because of that intoxication
that we liberals have experienced a
"sense of power," the "seductive
belief that in any contest between
good and evil, good always triumphs," and the "imperative legacy
of Virtue."
And now, if Brinkley is right,
that is all over. Society has rejected
our liberal values and we are left,
like Eliot's Gerontion-old men,
dull heads among windy spaces sourly hurling recriminations
against the society which has rejected those values.
Alan Brinkley is too good a scholar and too perceptive an observer
to be dismissed lightly. And his
words struck a responsive chord in
my own mind. For I have been
aware, not so much of a sourness
as of an emptiness, not so much of
rejection as of exclusion. The world
clearly has changed in the past few
years-who hould know that better
than a liberal who happens to be
both a Missouri Synod Lutheran and
a birthright Hoo ier? But what i it
that ha changed? nd how fundamental are the change ? nd how
potentially permanent?
From the reflection and qu -

d

an ffort to a
" r trying to do and to
timate
th probabl durability of what
r
po 1t1v ontribution we may have
mad during that time.
To th be t of my knowl dg and
b lief I approach thi task with
n ither ourne
nor bitterne s.
Whatever do er investigation may
how, I am confident that any fair
urvey of the past fifty years will
justify my conviction that we liberal had a very good innings. It may
also confirm my hypothesis that
Ronald Reagan and his crowd came
along none too soon; we had run
out of steam and needed someone
to take over from us.
My next two columns will be
reflections on the liberal contributions to the Church (October)
and to our national life (November). But before we go on to those
matters, let me comment briefly on
Brinkley's characterization of the
World War II generation of liberals,
which I have quoted above:
1. I will accept-at least for
myself-the suggestion that we came
of age imbued with a possible excess of optimism.
2. I do not recall feeling any great
certainty about this nation's righteousness. If anything, I tended to
accept too uncritically the accusations of villainy which, then as now,
were routinely made against us, especially by Europeans and Latin
Americans.
3. I think that, against the background of the shambles which Republican conservatives had made of
domestic affair and the chaos which
authoritarian regime had made of
international affair liberal had
ome rea onabl ground for confidence in their own moral claim to
leader hip.
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